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ABSTRACT 
The past twenty years have witnessed a dramatic rise in international 
adjudication, and especially in international investment arbitration. As 
international investment arbitration has become more prominent and 
pervasive, one of its fundamental tenets has come under fire: the practice 
of having the parties themselves nominate one or more of the arbitrators. 
Critics contend that party-appointed arbitrators are inherently biased and 
thus propose eliminating party-appointments altogether. In this article, I 
argue that moving away from party-appointed arbitrators is unwarranted 
and unwise, and would too radically transform international investment 
arbitration. Instead, I propose a simpler solution: adopting stricter 
arbitrator challenge rules and enlarging the pool of arbitrators. There is 
no need to gut the arbitration selection system to fix it. Instead, the 
solution lies in improving the process of deciding who decides the world's 
international investment disputes. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; LLM, 
JSD (Yale). This paper benefitted from suggestions made at the International and 
Comparative Law Colloquium at George Washington School of Law, the 
European Society of International Law Research Forum, the Faculty Exchange 
Colloquium at Temple University Beasely School of Law and the Faculty 
Workshop at Richmond University School of Law. I am particularly grateful to 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Susan Karamanian, Pieter Jan 
Kuijper, Sean Murphy, Catherine Rogers, Jeremy Sharpe, Guglielmo Verdirame, 
Santiago Villalpando, Michael Waibel, and to my colleagues Corinna Lain and Jim 
Gibson for their valuable comments. Fatema Munis provided excellent research 
assistance. 
431 
432 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 35:2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 433 
2. THE ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION ....................................................... .438 
2.1. How are International Arbitrators Selected? ....................... 440 
2.1.1. Selection by Parties .................................................... 442 
2.1.2. Selection by Neutral Third-Parties ............................ 446 
2.2. Eligibility Criteria: Qualifications and Competences of 
International Arbitrators ..................................................... .449 
2.2.1. Nationality ................................................................. 449 
2.2.2. Impartiality and Independence .................................. .451 
2.2.3. Legal Expertise and Other Requirements ................... 453 
3. DOES ARBITRATOR SELECTION WORK? AN 
ASSESSMENT ................................................................................ 454 
3.1. Criticisms of the Party-Appointment System Based on 
the Innate Bias .................................................................... ... 454 
3.2. Criticisms of the Party-Appointment System Based on 
the Lack ofDiversity .............................................................. 458 
3.3. Responding to Criticisms: Why Party-Appointments 
Should Remain ...................................................................... 461 
3.3.1. There Are No Good Alternatives ................................ 462 
3.3.2. Party Preference for Party-Appointments ................ .465 
3.3.3. Party-Appointment Is an Essential Element of 
International Investment Arbitration ........................ 469 
3.3.4. Procedural Safeguards Exist to Protect the System ... 471 
4. STRENGTHENING ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCEDURES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION ........................... 47 4 
4.1. Ensuring Impartiality (and Legitimacy) By Adopting 
Different Challenge Rules ..................................................... 474 
4.2. Ensuring Diversity (and Legitimacy) By Enlarging the 
Pool of Arbitrators .............................................................. .. .481 
4.2.1. Actions By Appointing Authorities and 
Secretariats ............................................................ ..... 482 
4.2.2. Actions By Parties .................................................... .. 484 
5. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 485 
2013] INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 433 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The past twenty years have seen a tremendous rise in 
international litigation.l More parties are prone to use 
international law mechanisms to resolve their disputes, and more 
forums are available to resolve them.2 Indeed, the multifaceted 
growth of international dispute resolution is widely considered 
"the single most important development of the post-Cold War 
age."3 In today's interconnected world, the tools used to resolve 
international disputes have never been more important. 
1 As an example, of the 125 cases filed at the International Court of Justice 
since 1947, 53 were filed after 1995, see List of Contentious Cases, INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JusTICE, http:/ jwww.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2013) (listing the name of all the contentious cases that have been 
filed with the ICJ since its inception, including the fifty-three cases filed since 
1995). Similarly, there were only thirty-eight cases filed with the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICISD) between 1972 and 1996, 
while fifty cases were filed in 2012 alone. See ICSID Caseload Statistics, INT'L CTR. 
FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTE, no. 2013-1, 2013, at 7, available at 
https:/ I icsid. worldbank.org/ICSID /FrontServlet?requestType= ICSIDDocRH&ac 
tion Val =Show Document&Case LoadStatistics=True&language= English41 
(representing diagrammatically the fact that fifty cases were registered with ICSID 
during the 2012 calendar year indicating a sharp rise in international disputes as 
compared to the period between 1972). Also consider that more than ninety 
percent of the judgments in the European Court of Human Rights' first fifty years 
were delivered between 1998 and 2009. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The 
European Court of Human Rights, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 323, 324 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012) (citing 
50 Years of Activity: The European Court of Human Rights- Some Facts and Figures (E. 
Ct. H.R. Pub., 2010), 3, 5). 
2 See generally THE RULES, PRACfiCE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INT'L COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012) (outlining the spectrum of the international 
arbitration field including the differing arbitral bodies, their performance and the 
overall efficacy of the system) [hereinafter RULES OF INTERNATIONAL COURT]. 
3 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The 
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 709, 709 (1999) (stating further that 
the enormous expansion of the international judiciary will probably be seen by 
future international lawyers and scholars as the single most significant post-cold 
war development in international law). See generally Jonathan I. Charney, The 
Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and 
Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 697 (1999) (discussing the history of 
international law and its contemporary ramifications, particularly the adherence 
to previous judgments and court procedures and the dramatic increase in the rate 
of change from ad hoc tribunals to permanent ones); Benedict Kingsbury, 
Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 
31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 679 (1999) (discussing the issue of the rapid 
proliferation of international courts and tribunals and the increased activity of 
many of the courts). 
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The growing importance of international courts and tribunals 
to resolve disputes has intensified scrutiny of their work. Nowhere 
is this truer than in the international investment arbitration context 
- the 11 fastest growing area of international law 11 4 and 11 the 
preferred option for the settlement of investment disputes.~~s 
International investment arbitration is a unique and semi-
private dispute resolution mechanism.6 International investment 
tribunals are often challenged to resolve very complex cases, in 
terms of both their public policy and financial implications. 
Indeed, politically, international investment tribunals hear highly 
significant and sensitive public issues with effects that go beyond 
the claims of the parties; these claims include issues related to a 
country's environmental policy, health regulations, and sovereign 
debt restructuring.? For example, in 2007, tens of thousands Italian 
bondholders, who lost substantial portions of their investment in 
Argentina's sovereign debt, challenged that country's debt 
restructuring policy upon alleged violations of international 
investment law.s In 2009, after lengthy and acrimonious litigations 
in both U.S. and Ecuadorian courts, the Chevron oil company 
initiated international investment proceedings in the Hague, 
against Ecuador, to contest billions of dollars that Ecuadorian 
courts mandated Chevron pay for environmental damage to 
4 Charles H. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the 
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 472. 
s Christoph Schreuer, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 787, 788 
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani eta!. eds., 2011). 
6 Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 471. 
7 Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 156, 
159-64 (2007) ("[A]rbitrators autonomously resolve core questions of public law: 
whether legislation is discriminatory, whether regulation is expropriation, 
whether a court decision is unfair or inequitable. The difficulty here is not that 
these issues are resolved by international adjudication but that they are resolved 
by private adjudicator without adequate supervision by public judges."). 
s Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /5, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ~~ 68, 238(i)-(iii) (Aug. 4, 2011) 
(formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others v. Argentine Republic). Note that the 
decision on jurisdiction of this case recognized the right of qualified bondholders 
to bring the case to an investment tribunal. The decision on the merit is still 
pending. In the current economic climate, this decision is highly anticipated and 
will likely have repercussion well beyond the present dispute. 
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Ecuadorian land.9 More recently, in November 2011, tobacco giant 
Philip Morris Asia challenged Australia's 2011 Tobacco Plain 
Packaging Act, which requires cigarette companies to adopt plain 
packages for cigarettes devoid of any individualized logo or 
intellectual property.10 
Further, in regards to state finances, claims brought by 
investors can amount to a large part of the budget of respondent 
states, so that "the findings of the tribunal may require major 
adjustment to public policy."11 Final awards often grant claimants 
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.12 For example, a 
recent decision awarded onshore crude producer Occidental 
approximately $1.7 billion in a dispute against Ecuador.B Two 
9 Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, Case No. 2009-23, Claimant's Notice of Arbitration (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
Sept. 23, 2009). See also Request of the Republic of Ecuador to the United States 
Oune 28, 2011) (containing a request by Ecuador to submit the dispute regarding 
international investment to an arbitral tribunal). 
1o Philip Morris Asia (H.K.) v. Commonwealth of Australia UNCITRAL, Case 
No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration (Perm Ct. Arb. Nov. 11, 2011). The case was 
brought under the Honk Kong-Australia BIT and is still pending at the PCA. 
Philip Morris Asia contests the public health effects of the law claims that the 
regulation substantially deprives its investment of its value. Pleadings and 
information are available on the web site of the Australian Government at: 
http:/ J www.ag.gov.au/ internationalrelations/ internationallaw J pages/ tobaccop 
lainpackaging.aspx. A similar case was filed by the Swiss subsidiary of Philip 
Morris against Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT, in relation to 
legislation adopted in 2008-09 by Uruguay, requiring all cigarettes manufacturers 
to adopt a single presentation requirement. The case is FTR Holding S.A., Philip 
Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) & Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (2010). The case is pending in front of an 
ICSID Tribunal. For more information, see https:J Jicsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet. 
n Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? (Nov. 5, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript at 2, quoted with permission) (on file with author). 
12 See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003) (ordering the respondent to pay U.S. $269,814,000 
plus interest accruing at a rate of ten percent to claimant); EDF Int'l S.A., SAUR 
Int'l S.A. & Le6n Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/23, Award Gun. 11, 2012) (awarding claimants U.S. 
$136,138,430 for damages plus interest); Kyriaki Karadeli, Eni Hit with Hefty Gas 
Price Hike, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sept. 25, 2012), http:/ /globalarbitrationreview.com 
Jnewsjarticle/30846/ (highlighting the UNCITRAL panel in The Hague orderirlg 
the Italian company ENI to pay €833 million to Dutch trader GasTerra). 
13 Occidental Petroleum Corp., eta!. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/11, Award,~ 876(v) (Oct. 5, 2012). 
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pending cases claim damages for over four billion dollars each.14 
To finance the settlement of an ICSID claim, for example, the 
government of Paraguay recently decided to issue treasury bonds 
for about U.S. $21 million.ls 
Most international investment arbitrations are decided by a 
three-member arbitral tribunal comprised of two party-appointed 
arbitrators (one per side) and a presiding arbitrator, chosen either 
by the parties themselves or by a neutral third-party. By and large, 
the parties decide who resolves their international investment 
disputes. 
In recent years, this party-constructed system has come under 
fire,16 Critics, focusing specifically on the selection of party-
appointed arbitrators, argue that they are biased and lack diversity, 
and are therefore inadequate to decide international disputes.17 
14 Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, Case No. AA '227 
(Perm. Crt. Arb.); Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07 /5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ~~ 68, 238(i)-(iii) (Aug. 4, 
2011) (formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others v. Argentine Republic). 
15 Sebastian Perry, Paraguay to Settle ICSID Claim with Bond Issuance, GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. Guly 19, 2013), http:/ /globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article 
/31757 /paraguay-settle-icsid-claim-bond-issuance. 
16 See generally Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies 
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45, 75-93 (2013) 
(discussing the changing nature of investment arbitration). 
17 Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle 
Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, 
www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-
tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html (stating, in reference to NAFTA 
arbitration, that "[t]heir meetings are secret. Their members are generally 
unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a 
small group of international tribunals handles disputes between investors and 
foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice systems 
questioned and environmental regulations challenged. And it is all in the name of 
protecting the rights of foreign investors."). See also VAN HARTEN, supra note 7 
(discussing the effect of a perceived lack of openness in the arbitration system in 
terms of revealing the reasonirlg underpinning the reasoning of an award); 
Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 489 (stating that critics argue that arbitration is 
not suited for settlement of public law disputes as the arbitrators are "privately 
contracted" by the parties); Behind Closed Doors: A Hard Struggle to Shed Some Light 
on a Legal Grey Area, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2009, available at www. 
economist.com/node/13527961 (reviewing the issue of transparency and secrecy 
in international arbitration and assessing calls for increased transparency). 
Published statistics refute this assertion. For example, ICSID found that in cases 
decided by ICSID Tribunals as of 2012 under the rules of the ICSID Convention or 
of the Additional Facility, only forty-eight percent of all the awards uphold claims 
in part of in full, while twenty-two percent of the awards decline jurisdiction, 
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Thus far, the debate is largely confined to polarized practitioners 
who either defend the status quolB or suggest the elimination of the 
party selection process entirely.19 
I argue that both approaches miss the mark. In particular, the 
radical changes now on the table are both unwarranted and 
unwise, and would deprive the parties of one of the fundamental 
reasons that led them to choose international arbitration: they are 
the ones to decide who decides their dispute. In the end, one need 
not gut the arbitration system to fix it. A better solution lies in 
fixing it by adopting better challenges rules and enlarging the pool 
of arbitrators. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, I first explain the 
process by which arbitrators are selected, and then analyze the 
selectivity requirements to become an arbitrator. In Part II, I 
consider the problems with the current arbitrator selection process, 
and ultimately reject the call to abandon the party-appointment 
selection mechanism as a solution to these problems. In Part III, I 
propose an alternative solution to reform the process rather than 
gut it. In the end, reforms are necessary, and the ones I suggest 
will be sufficient to rescue and strengthen the international 
arbitration system. 
twenty-nine percent dismiss claims, and one percent decide that claims are 
manifestly without legal merits. See ICSID Caseload Statistics, supra note 1, at 13. 
On this issue, see Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 477-487 (2009) (arguing that the international 
arbitration system currently functions reasonably well without needing radical 
structural overhaul) and Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (2007) (statistically 
supporting the contention that more than 57.7% of cases end without investors 
receiving an award or payment of an award). 
18 See e.g., Charles N. Brower, Michael Pulos & Charles B. Rosenberg, So Is 
There Anything Really Wrong with International Investment Arbitration as We Know 
it?, in THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2012 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2013) (suggesting that 
certain alterations or 'tweaks' to the system of appointment of arbitrators could be 
beneficial to international arbitration). 
19 See Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID 
REV. F. INV. L.J. 339, 355 (2010) ("[M]y proposal that we turn our backs on the 
practice of unilateral appointments."); Hans Srnit, The Pernicious Institution of the 
Party-Appointed Arbitrators, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 33, 2010, at 1, available at 
http:/ J www. vcc.columbia.edu/ files J vale/ print/Perspective_33_Smit_2. pdf 
(stating that "party-appointed arbitrators should be banned" unless their 
affiliation to the party that nominated them is fully disclosed). 
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2. THE ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
International investment arbitration is a sui generis dispute 
resolution system rooted in public international law, which 
characteristically involves disputes between a foreign private 
investor and the state recipient of the investment.2D At its core, the 
system seeks to create a neutral forum to arbitrate disputes 
between foreign investors and host states21 and to provide an 
impartial and reliable dispute resolution system outside national 
courts of either of the parties involved.22 Parties' preference for 
arbitration has made it "the first-choice method of binding dispute 
resolution."23 
State consent to settle investor disputes with international 
investment arbitration is most often expressed in bilateral 
20 For a short overview, see generally Brooks W. Daly, Pennanent Court of 
Arbitration, in RULFS OF INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 2, at 37; Carolyn Lamm 
et a!., International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, in RULFS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CoURT, supra note 2, at 77 (discussing in detail the establishment of 
a neutral forum to decide disputes between states and foreign investors); Abby 
Cohen Smutny, Arbitration Before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, 2002 Bus. L. INT'L 367 (2002); Abby Cohen Smutny, ICSID Arbitration: 
Procedural Review, 2 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 35 (2005) (discussing the 
proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties which provides a 
forum to settle disputes). 
21 SCHREUER, supra note 5, at 788 ("International arbitration provides an 
attractive alternative to the settlement of investment disputes by national courts 
or through diplomatic protection. Arbitration offers the parties the opportunity to 
select arbitrators who enjoy their confidence and who have the necessary 
expertise in the field. The private nature of the arbitration, assuring the 
confidentiality of proceedings, is often valued by parties to major economic 
development projects, although recently there have been calls for more 
transparency in international arbitration."). 
22 W. Michael Reisman, International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 ARB. INT'L 
231, 235 (2002) ("The private actor is generally unwilling to subject itself to the 
jurisdiction of the courts in command economies or economies in transition and 
even when a local judiciary can boast a decree of independence, the prudent 
foreign investor will be alert to subtle factors that could predispose a national 
court in favor of the home-town team. For its part, the government that hosts an 
international transaction or is a party to it is, ordinarily, unwilling to subject itself 
to the jurisdiction of the national courts of the foreign investor."). 
23 Adrian Winstanely, Why Arbitration Institutions Matter, LAW IN TRANSIDON: 
CONTRACf ENFORCEMENT, Autumn 2001, at 33, 34; see id. at 33 (identifying several 
reasons that explain parties' favor for arbitration, inCluding privacy and 
confidentiality, cost-effectiveness, party-control, neutrality, and speed). 
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international treaties (BITs).24 These treaties generally designate 
investment arbitration to resolve disputes thus inserting a 
predominately private international law dispute resolution 
mechanism onto public international law.zs Indeed, Professor 
Anthea Roberts calls international treaties the "platypus of 
international law," because, although they share certain features 
with better-known species, they remain a very distinctive and 
exceptional animal.26 
24 Indeed, the exponential growth of international investment in recent years 
has resulted in a tangible increase in BITs between foreign states, as well as 
regional and multilateral investment treaties. More rarely, consent can also derive 
from a contract between the state and the foreign investor in relation to a 
particular project or from national legislation. See Antonio R. Parra, The Settlement 
of Investment Dispute: The Experience of ICSID in Transitional Countries and Elsewhere, 
LAW IN TRANSITION: CONTRACf ENFORCEMENT, Autumn 2001, at 38, 39 (noting that 
the number of BITs has risen from 400 by the end of 1990 to 2,000 in 2000, and 
about 170 countries have signed one or more of these treaties.); see also Brower & 
Schill, supra note 4, at 472 (explaining that "investment treaties have proliferated 
to an unprecedented degree, having surged from less than 400 in 1989 to well over 
2,500 bilateral, regional and sectorial treaties today" and that "the volume on 
investor-state arbitrations under there treaties has risen just within the last decade 
to well over two hundred, with new arbitrations being initiated on an almost 
daily basis."). 
2S Roberts, supra note 16, at 45 ("[T]he investment treaty system grafts private 
international law dispute resolution mechanisms onto public international law 
treaties. However, there are other ways to understand the beast based on the 
regulatory relationship it establishes between host states (as governors) and 
foreign investors (as governed)."). The prototypical investment dispute no longer 
concerns a relatively easily identified case of nationali?ation of property without 
payment of compensation. Instead, "[i]nvestors are increasingly challenging 
specific regulatory actions [taken with respect to a particular investor] (such as the 
denial of building or operating permits) or general regulatory measures [adopted 
with respect to the public at large] (such as measures taken concerning the 
economy, the environment, human rights, and health and safety)" where these 
have adverse effects on foreign investors. Id. at 45-46. See also Andrea K. 
Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REv. 
1269, 1270 (2008) ("Investment arbitration often involves public international law 
grafted onto a substructure of private commercial arbitration."). 
26 Roberts, supra note 16, at 93. In terms of origin, international treaties are 
public international law agreements entered into by states acting in their public 
capacities. In terms of procedure, they permit investors to bring arbitral claims 
directly against states based on rules closely resembling those developed in the 
private international law that governs international commercial arbitrations and 
investor-state contracts. In terms of function, they empower privately constituted 
arbitral tribunals to hear cases going to the heart of states' public, regulatory 
powers. And in terms of subject matter, they require a sensitive balancing of 
individual rights against societal interests, and economic interests against non-
440 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 35:2 
One of these distinctive features is that the parties involved in 
the case - a private actor and a state - are largely in charge of 
deciding who decides their dispute. In the section below, I first 
explain how arbitrator selections are made, and then assess the 
requirements used to select arbitrators. 
2.1. How Are International Investment Arbitrators Selected? 
Professor William W. Park, a frequent arbitrator, remarked that 
the three key elements in international arbitration are "arbitrator, 
arbitrator, arbitrator."27 Indeed, because arbitration decisions 
come from the arbitral panels, it is essential to understand who 
selects the international arbitrators that take the decision- and who 
gets selected.28 The selection and appointment of arbitrators in 
international tribunals involves multiple steps, which depend on 
the applicable international treaty and the institutional rules 
applicable to the dispute.29 
The specific applicable procedures are found in the relevant 
dispute resolution instrument on which the parties rely to bring 
the case, normally the applicable BIT or a regional investment and 
trade agreement-3D Dispute resolution instruments generally 
economic goals, in a manner reminiscent of human rights law and trade law 
treaties. Id. at 93-94. 
27 Catherine A. Rogers, The International Arbitrator Information Project: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOC (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http:/ /kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/08/09/the-international-
arbitrator-information-project-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/ (citing Rusty Parks' 
remark that, "[i]n real estate the three key elements are 'location, location, 
location,' . . . in arbitration the applicable trinity is 'arbitrator, arbitrator, 
arbitrator."'). 
28 Indeed, the legitimacy of judicial decision-making relies on the person 
making the decision. This is all the more true in international investment 
arbitration, which is essentially premised on the free acceptance by private parties 
of the arbitral procedure. See generally Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the 
International System, 82 AM. J. INTL L. 705 (arguing that decision makers who are 
perceived as legitimate enhance the legitimacy of the dispute resolution system 
itself). See also Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 
41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 107, 110 (2009) (arguing that a legitimate international 
adjudicative body is one whose authority is perceived as justified). 
29 For an excellent discussion on the selection process at the International 
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, see generally Ruth 
Mackenzie et al., SELECfiNG INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND 
POLITICS (2010). 
30 More rarely, a contract or national investment law may also provide for 
international investment arbitration as an option. See ICSID Caseload Statistics, 
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provide for arbitration either under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
other States (ICSID Convention), or under the Arbitration Rules of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).31 For example, the recently 
redrafted 2012 U.S. Model BIT explains that claimants can submit 
their claims under the ICSID Convention and ICSID Rules, the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.32 
supra note 1 (graphically indicating the number of cases registered in a calendar 
year). 
31 See Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States (amended April 2006) [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention]; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010, G.A. Res. 65/22, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 Gan. 10, 2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(2010)]. In this article, I focus on ICSID and the PCA because the great majority of 
the known international investment disputes are brought in one of these fora and 
are resolved under their rules of procedures. Conclusions reached analyzing their 
practice, therefore, provide generally applicable lessons. 
32 U.S. MODEL BIT, art. 24(3) (2012), available at http:/ jwww.state.gov/e/ 
eb/ifd/bit/index.htm (indicating that "[p]rovided that six months have elapsed 
since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to 
in paragraph 1: a. under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both respondent and the non-disputing 
Party are parties to the ICSID Convention; b. under the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules, provided that either the respondent or the non-disputing party is a party to 
the ICSID Convention; c. under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or d. if the 
claimant and respondent agree, to any other arbitration institution or under any 
other arbitration rules"). Similarly, Chapter Eleven of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFT A) contains provisions related to the settlement of 
disputes related to cross-borders investors and provides that investors can submit 
their claims under the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1992), available at http:/ jwww.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/ enjview.aspx?x=299&mtpiiD=142 #A1125 (indicating that "[e]xcept 
as provided in Annex 1120.1, and provided that six months have elapsed since the 
events giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to 
arbitration under: (a) the ICSID Convention, provided that both the disputing 
Party and the Party of the investor are parties to the Convention; (b) the 
Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, provided that either the disputing Party or the 
Party of the investor, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; or (c) the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules"). Other rules complete the procedural framework 
applicable to ICSID disputes, including the ICSID Rules for Arbitration 
Proceedings, the Administrative and Financial Regulations, the Rules of 
Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings and the 
Additional Facility Rules. These rules can be found on the website of ICSID at 
https:j /icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ RulesMain.jsp. UNCITRAL rules 
can be found on the PCA website at http:/ /pca-cpa.org/shownews 
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As discussed below, the selection of the three-person arbitral 
tribunal is done by the parties to the dispute themselves, or by a 
neutral appointing authority.33 Each party typically appoints one 
arbitrator, and the presiding arbitrator is selected by agreement of 
the parties, or, more often, by an appointing authority.34 
2.1.1. Selection by Parties 
In most cases, each party in the dispute selects at least one 
arbitrator. This allowance gives the parties substantial say on the 
persons selected to judge their case, and is one of the most 
important features of international arbitration. As one 
commentator explains "the selection of the party-appointed 
arbitrator may be the most critical decision in an international 
.asp?ac=actual&pag_id=1261. Similarly, the Permanent Court of Arbitration also 
provides for additional and more specific rules. In December 2012, the 
Administrative Council of the PCA adopted a new set of procedural rules, the 
"PCA Arbitration Rules 2012," for the arbitration of disputes involving at least 
one State, a State-controlled entity, or an international organization, which 
consolidate previous rules of procedures. The new Rules are available at 
http:/ jwww.pca-cpa.org/ showpage.asp?pag_id=1188. They are a consolidation 
of four sets of PCA procedural rules from the 1990s - the Optional Rules for 
Arbitrating Disputes between Two States (1992), the Optional Rules for 
Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State (1993), the 
Optional Rules for Arbitration Between International Organizations and States 
(1996), and the Optional Rules for Arbitration Between International 
Organizations and Private Parties (1996). 
33 There are three overall mechanisms to select international judges and 
arbitrators: by the parties in the dispute, by a neutral party, or by election. As 
discussed in details infra, in most international arbitrations, the parties themselves 
can select their own arbitrators. Parties can also select ad hoc judges at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in certain circumstances. Second, arbitrators 
can be selected by a neutral third party under certain circumstances, including 
inaction by one of the disputing party, the selection of the President of the 
tribunal and the selection of members of ad hoc committees. A neutral appointing 
authority can also be tasked with the selection of specific arbitrators. Third, 
judges in international courts are first nominated (usually by a national 
nominating committee) and then elected by a decision making body of an 
international organization (for example the General Assembly and the Security 
Council of the United Nations). In UN courts, including the International Courts 
of Justice and the International Criminal Court, the election of judges is partially a 
political process subject to election campaigning and vote trading. See generally 
Mackenzie et a!., supra note 29 (describing in detail the process of selecting 
judges). 
34 See generally Lamm et al., supra note 20. 
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arbitral proceeding."3s It can be even at par with the choice of 
counsel.36 
For the parties, having a say in deciding their case is both 
appealing and reassuring, and strengthens their support to the 
entire process.37 Parties to international investment arbitration 
consistently indicate party-appointment as a strong reason to 
prefer arbitration to litigation.JB Professor Catherine Rogers calls 
the notion of party-appointed arbitrators "the ultimate form of 
forum shopping" because the arbitral tribunal can, in the absence 
of party agreement, determine many pivotal procedural issues, as 
well as the nature and conduct of hearings, the allocation of costs 
and fees, issues of evidence, and of course the tribunal ultimately 
decides the substantive outcome of the case.39 
35 Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to 
Consider, 17 MEALEYS INT'L ARB. REP. 10 (2002). Similarly, Wendy Miles notes 
"[t]he constitution of the arbitral tribunal is one of the most important steps in an 
international arbitration. The skills and qualifications of the arbitrator/ s and the 
number of members on the tribunal may have significant impact on the 
development of the dispute resolution and, ultimately, the award itself." Wendy 
Miles, International Arbitrator Appointment, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 37 (2002). 
36 See Constantine Partasides, The Selection, Appointment and Challenge of 
Arbitrators, 5 VINDOBONA J. 217, 217 (2001) (observing that the ability of the parties 
to influence the composition of the arbitral tribunal is one of the defining aspects 
of the arbitral process and that "their power to appoint, and the power to 
challenge, arbitrators are two of their most powerful tools"). 
37 See Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. OF INT'L 
& COMP. L. 502, 503 (2006) (mentioning that the parties prefer the outcomes of 
their disputes to be warranted by a fair legal process which involves an 
independent legal analysis of the dispute); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of 
International Arbitrators, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957 (2005) (stating that in modern 
scenarios parties want the outcomes of their disputes to be warranted by reasons 
from an impartial authority bound by law); Rogers, supra note 27 ("Empirical 
studies consistently verify that parties' ability to select arbitrators is one of the 
primary reasons they select arbitration as a means of dispute resolution."). 
38 In view of the current debate on the best selection method for arbitral 
tribunal, a recent survey asked private practitioners, in-house counsel and 
arbitrators what were their preferred methods for selecting arbitrators. A 
substantial majority of respondents (seventy-six percent) preferred the selection of 
two co-arbitrators by each party unilaterally. The authors of the survey 
concluded "these figures show that there is general disapproval of the recent 
proposals calling for an end to unilateral party appointment." Paul Friedland & 
Stavros Brekoulakis, 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred 
Practices in the Arbitral Process, WHITE & CASE, p. 5 (2012), 
http:// annualreview2012.whitecase.corn/ 
International_Arbitra tion_Survey _2012. pdf. 
39 Rogers, supra note 27. 
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The dispute resolution clause of most BITs typically provides 
for the arbitration selection method to be adopted in the 
proceedings. For example, the 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides that, 
unless otherwise agreed by the disputing parties, 11 the tribunal 
shall comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each 
of the disputing parties and the third, who shall be the presiding 
arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.1140 
In the absence of choice, the ICSID Convention also contains 
default rules. Under ICSID, the arbitral Tribunal 11 shall consist of 
three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the 
third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by 
agreement of the parties."41 UNCITRAL Rules contain a similar 
provtston. They provide that 11 if three arbitrators are to be 
appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator."42 
40 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 32, at art. 27 (providing for the selection of 
arbitrators). Likewise, NAFTA Article 1123 provides for the number of arbitrators 
and method of appointment and explains that "unless the disputing parties 
otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator 
appointed by each of the disputing parties and the third, who shall be the 
presiding arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the disputing parties." NAFTA, 
supra note 32, at art. 1123 (providing for the Number of Arbitrators and Method of 
Appointment). 
41 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 37 ("(1) The Arbitral Tribunal shall 
be constituted as soon as possible after registration of a request pursuant to 
Article 36 (2) (a) The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven 
number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree (b) Where the parties do 
not agree upon the number of arbitrators and the method of their appointment, 
the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each 
party and the third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by 
agreement of the parties."). 
42 The Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
commonly referred to as UNCITRAL Rules, were first adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1976 by G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. 
Doc. A/31/17 at 182 (Dec. 15, 1976) (recognizing the value of arbitration in the 
settling of disputes) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976)]. The Rules 
were revised in 2010 and the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules were adopted by the UN 
General Assembly with G.A. Res. 65/22. They apply to arbitration agreement 
concluded after August 15, 2010. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are recognized as 
a very successful text and are used in a variety of cases, including disputes 
between private commercial parties, investor-State disputes, State-to-State 
disputes, and commercial disputes. The first paragraph of the UNCITRAL Rules, 
art. 9 (2010) provides that "1. If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party 
shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the 
third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the arbitral tribunal." 
The full text of the Rules can be found on the website of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at http:/ /PCA-CPA.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1064. 
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Parties and their counsel spend substantial time and resources 
selecting the party-appointed arbitrator, underlining the 
importance of the issue.43 A proposed arbitrator's prior decisions 
and academic writings are scrutinized, as are any previous 
professional positions and relations.44 In selecting their candidates, 
parties also take into consideration the applicable law, the forum, 
the kind of dispute, the location, the nationality of the parties, as 
well as many others issues. 
Selection is also affected by a party's position in the case. For 
the claimant, the choice of arbitrator comes early, as the claimant 
has the right to nominate an arbitrator in the request for arbitration 
with which the arbitration begins. Thus, as the claimant goes first, 
the selection of the claimant's arbitrator is particularly delicate 
because it is done without knowledge of any other member of the 
tribunal or counsel for opposing party, and in the general posture 
of the case.45 The selection is normally completed after serious 
research by counsel representing the claimant in consultation with 
the client. 
The selection of arbitrators by the respondent state is also often 
complex, as it involves the advice of several governmental agencies 
43 Claudia T. Salomon advises to take five factors into consideration when 
choosing an arbitrator: first, select someone with legal and professional 
experience; second, choose an impartial but known party-appointed arbitrator 
and a neutral president; third, choose an arbitrator who manages people well; 
fourth, choose an arbitrator who demonstrates communicative proficiency and_ 
juridical open-mindedness; fifth and finally, choose an arbitrator with a 
manageable case-load. See Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for 
Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 395, 395 (1998) (emphasizing that selection of 
an arbitrator by one party is the single most determinative step in arbitration); 
Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to Consider, 17 
MEALEY's INT'L ARB. REP. 1, 1-4 (2002). See also Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-
Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies - Some Reflections, 30 TEXAS INT'L 
L. J. 59, 60 (1995) (reflecting on certain aspects of the process of selecting 
arbitrators); James Wangelin, Effective Selection of Arbitrators in International 
Arbitration, 14 MEALEY's INT'L ARB. REP. 69, 70 (1999) (citing Lord Hacking's list of 
qualifications for an arbitrator). 
44 LUCY REED, }AN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 
77-79 (2d. ed. 2011). 
45 Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 13 ("The parties to investment arbitration 
cases and especially their counsel spend a great deal of time and effort to 
scrutinize the backgrounds of arbitrators, their relationship with the parties, 
published works and prior appointments. The time spent on choosing the right 
arbitrators suggests that the personality and background of the arbitrator matters 
substantially for arbitration outcomes."). 
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that can potentially be involved in the litigation. In the United 
States, the office of the legal adviser of the State Department often 
takes the lead, although it often consults with U.S. government 
offices, including the Department of Commerce, the Treasury and 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.46 Given the growing 
public relevance of international investment arbitration, the 
selection of the arbitrator by the state also becomes essential, as it is 
an important instrument for the state to broaden the dispute 
beyond its bilateral terms and to include adequate consideration of 
the public interest.47 
In the great majority of cases, parties themselves select their 
arbitrators; in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, this occurs up to seventy-five percent of the time.48 
2.1.2. Selection by Neutral Third-Parties 
A neutral authority can also play a role in the arbitrators' 
selection process under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules. The 
neutral appointing authority selects an arbitrator when, as it is 
often the case, there is no agreement among the parties on the 
selection of the president of the arbitral tribunal, or when one of 
the parties defaults in its selection.49 
46 Jeremy K. Sharpe, Representing a Respondent State in Investment Arbitration, 
in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A PRACfiTIONER'S GUIDE 
(Chiara Giorgetti ed.) (forthcoming Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 2014). 
47 See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, The Selection of Arbitrators, in THE IRAN-UNITED 
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION 
65 (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds., 2000) (discussing in some detail the 
process of choosing the third-country arbitrators at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal). 
48 Eloise M. Obadia, Remarks by Eloise M. Obadia at 105th ASIL Annual Meeting, 
105 AM. Soc'y INT'L PROC. 74 (2011). Historically, of the total 850 appointments 
made by ICSID in cases registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional 
facility since its first case, 460 were made by parties. In 2012, party-appointed 
arbitrators counted for 101 of the 139 appointments, showing a trend toward 
greater party-selection. ICSID Caseload Statistics, supra note 1, at 19, 31. 
49 ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, r. 3 (amended 2006) 
[hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules] (stating rule three titled II Appointment of 
Arbitrators to a Tribunal Constituted in Accordance with Convention Article 
37(2)(b))11 and provides that 11 (1) If the Tribunal is to be constituted in accordance 
with Article 37(2)(b) of the Convention: (a) either party shall in a communication 
to the other party: (i) name two persons, identifying one of them, who shall not 
have the same nationality as nor be a national of either party, as the arbitrator 
appointed by it, and the other as the arbitrator proposed to be the President of the 
Tribunal; and (ii) invite the other party to concur in the appointment of the 
arbitrator proposed to be the President of the Tribunal and to appoint another 
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In ICSID proceedings, if the respondent defaults or the parties 
cannot agree on a president, the Chairman of ICSID's 
Administrative Council, who is also the President of the World 
Bank, will appoint the missing arbitrators.so In his choice of 
arbitrators, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council is 
restricted to those people listed in a Panel of Arbitrators, which 
contains names of arbitrators selected by ICSID Contracting Parties 
and by the Chairman.sl The Chairman also selects the three 
arbitrator; (b) promptly upon receipt of this communication the other party shall, 
in its reply: (i) name a person as the arbitrator appointed by it, who shall not have 
the same nationality as nor be a national of either party; and (ii) concur in the 
appointment of the arbitrator proposed to be the President of the Tribunal or 
name another person as the arbitrator proposed to be President; (c) promptly 
upon receipt of the reply containing such a proposal, the initiating party shall 
notify the other party whether it concurs in the appointment of the arbitrator 
proposed by that party to be the President of the Tribunal. (2) The 
communications provided for in this Rule shall be made or promptly confirmed in 
writing and shall either be transmitted through the Secretary-General or directly 
between the parties with a copy to the Secretary-General"). See also ICSID 
Convention, supra note 31, at art. 37. 
50 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 38 ("If the Tribunal shall not have 
been constituted within 90 days after notice of registration of the request has been 
dispatched by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph (3) of Article 
36, or such other period as the parties may agree, the Chairman shall, at the 
request of either party and after consulting both parties as far as possible, appoint 
the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed. Arbitrators appointed by the 
Chairman pursuant to this Article shall not be nationals of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute or of the Contracting State whose national is a party to the 
dispute."). In practice, what happens is that once the ninety days have expired, 
the ICSID Secretariat would first try to find an agreement between the parties. To 
that end, they will first propose to the parties a roster of three persons and ask the 
parties to advise the Secretary General - and not each other - whether they would 
agree on these proposals, without explanations. If the parties agree, then the 
person is named and becomes the president of the tribunal. This result would be 
counted as a party-selection. See Obadia, supra note 48, at 76. NAFTA similarly 
provides that if the tribunal is not constituted within ninety days from the date of 
the claim submission to arbitration, the Secretary-General, on the request of either 
disputing party, shall appoint the arbitrators not yet appointed. See also NAFTA, 
supra note 32, at art. 1124(2), 275 (providing that "If a Tribunal, other than a 
Tribunal established under Article 1126, has not been constituted within 90 days 
from the date that a claim is submitted to arbitration, the Secretary-General, on 
the request of either disputing party, shall appoint, in his discretion, the arbitrator 
or arbitrators not yet appointed, except that the presiding arbitrator shall be 
appointed in accordance with paragraph 3"). 
51 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 40 (" (1) Arbitrators may be 
appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators, except in the case of 
appointments by the Chairman pursuant to Article 38."). Each contracting state 
has a right to designate up to four persons to the Panel of Arbitrators. The 
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members of ad hoc annulment committees, a special, party-led 
procedure that offers limited review on awards. When selecting 
members of ad hoc annulment committees, the Chairman is also 
limited to nominate only members from the Panel of Arbitrators 
and cannot designate those nominated to the Panel of Arbitrators 
by either of the two States involved.52 
Similarly, under both the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976,53 and 
2010,54 parties can request the Secretary General of the PCA to 
designate an "appointing authority" for the purpose of appointing 
an arbitral tribunal if they fail to do so by the proscribed limit of 
thirty days.55 In addition, under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, a 
party may also propose that the PCA Secretary General himself 
acts as the appointing authority. 56 
UNCITRAL provisions also specify how the appointing 
authority should make his nomination. First, at the request of one 
of the parties, the appointing authority communicates to both 
parties an identical list containing at least three names for possible 
appointment as arbitrator. Second, within a specified deadline, 
each party returns the list to the appointing authority after deleting 
the names to which the party objects and numbering the remaining 
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Tribunal can designate ten persons. The 
appointment is for ten years, but it can continue until the nomination is expressly 
revoked. 
52 The latest published ICSID Statistics explain that as of May 20, 2012, there 
were 158 signatories to the ICSID Convention. See List of Contracting States And 
Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID (Nov. 1, 2013), https:/ /icsid. 
worldbank.org/1 CSID j FrontServ let ?request Type= I CSIDDocRH&action Val =Sho 
wDocument&language=English. Under ICSID Convention, article 13, each 
Contracting party may designate to the Panel of Arbitrators four persons, 
including its nationals. The Chairman can designate ten persons, each having a 
different nationality. Not all contracting states have exercised their right to 
nominate. Obadia states that there were 350 persons designated to the panel of 
arbitrators in April2011. See Obadia, supra note 48, at 75. 
53 Note that under UNCITRAL Rules, the first attempt to choose the 
presiding arbitrator is given to the two part-appointed arbitrators. U.N. Comm'n 
on Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 6, 7, 12, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976). 
54 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Arbitration Rules (as 
revised in 2010), G.A. Res. 65/22, art. 6.8-13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 Gan. 10, 
2010). 
55 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 111TH ANN. REP. 1 (2011). For an 
interesting overview of the PCA' s appointing authority activity in 2011, see id. at 
11-13. 
56 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 6. 
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names on the list in the order of preference. Third, and finally, the 
appointing authority will select the missing arbitrators following 
the preferences outlined by the parties.s7 The majority of the 
requests to appoint Respondent's arbitrators were withdrawn as 
the selection was then made by the party itsel£.58 
After detailing who decides, the next section examines who can 
be nominated, and thus be asked to decide. 
2.2. Eligibility Criteria: Qualifications and Competences of 
International Arbitrators 
In addition to providing a framework that specifies how to 
select arbitrators, applicable rules of procedure also require 
arbitrators to possess certain legal qualifications and competences, 
which, as discussed below, are rather general.S9 
2.2.1. Nationality 
First, under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, certain 
nationality restrictions apply. Under Article 39 of the ICSID 
Convention, the majority of the Tribunal must be "nationals of 
States other than the Contracting State party to the dispute and the 
Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute."6o To 
57 See id. at art. 6. See also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, 
at art. 7. 
58 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 55, at 11-13. Note that in 
2011, under the above UNCITRAL provisions, the PCA received eighteen new 
requests for the Secretary-General to designate an appointing authority for the 
appointment of arbitrators and ten requests for the Secretary-General to act as 
appointing authority for the appointment of arbitrators. Among these, eight 
relate to the appointment of the presiding arbitrator or a sole arbitrator. Id. 
59 Note that more recently, newly constituted courts and tribunals have 
added more detailed requirements for selection. Specifically, the Statute of the 
recently established International Criminal Court requires judges to have 
expertise in criminal law and procedure or, alternatively, have expertise in 
international humanitarian law and human rights law. See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, art. 36, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 Guly 17, 1998) 
(requiring geographical distribution and representation of the principle legal 
systems of the world, as well as a fair representation of female and male judges). 
60 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 39 ("The majority of the arbitrators 
shall be national of States other than the Contracting State party to the dispute 
and the Contracting State whose national is a part to the dispute and the 
Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute; provided, however, 
that the foregoing provisions of this Article shall not apply if the sole arbitrator or 
each individual member of the Tribunal has been appointed by agreement of the 
parties."). 
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avoid that the party making the first appointment selects one of its 
nationals, and thus blocks the other party from doing the same, 
Rule 1(3) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules requires the consent of the 
other party to appoint national arbitrators.61 
Rules under UNCITRAL are similarly general, but are 
somehow less stringent in relation to nationality requirements. 
Article 7 of UNCITRAL requires the appointing authority to only 
take into account "the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a 
nationality other than the nationalities of the parties."62 
The reasons for the exclusion of arbitrators who share the same 
nationality with one of the parties can be found in the presumption 
that such arbitrators may be perceived as being too close to the 
appointing party, and therefore be inclined to be excessively 
sympathetic to that party's position. As Swigart observes, "as an 
identifier, nationality suggests more than a mere category of 
citizenship or allegiance to a particular state."63 Nationality, as 
explained below, is also an important mark of diversity.64 
61 ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 49, at r. 3, 104-05 (" (1) If the Tribunal is 
to be constituted in accordance with Article 37(2)(b) of the Convention: (a) either 
party shall in a communication to the other party: (i) name two persons, 
identifying one of them, who shall not have the same nationality as nor be a 
national of either party, as the arbitrator appointed by it, and the other as the 
arbitrator proposed to be the President of the Tribunal."). 
62 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, at art. 6(4); UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 6(7). 
63 Leigh Swigart, The "National Judge": Some Reflections on Diversity in 
International Courts and Tribunals, 42 McGEORGE L.R. 223, 224 (2010) ("Like their 
domestic counterparts, international courts and tribunals depend on public faith 
in their judges to inspire confidence in court decisions and in the judicial system 
more generally. These courts look for the same qualities in their judges as those 
laid out in national codes of conduct and other documents like the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct, such as independence, impartiality, integrity, 
propriety, equality, competence, and diligence. Both domestic and international 
courts also recognize that some relationships, involving such things as a prior 
connection to a case or the parties or an interest in the outcome of the case, might 
give rise to actual or perceived partiality. International courts, however, have 
something to contend with that domestic courts do not. Unlike domestic courts, 
international courts must consider the nationalities of its judges, and how these 
nationalities may affect the judges' ability to decide cases involving their states of 
origin with impartiality and independence. While this concern can be an issue in 
all of the major categories of international courts and tribunals - i.e., human 
rights, interstate dispute resolution, and criminal - it may be most relevant in 
cases where states themselves are the parties before the court."). 
64 See infra Parts II.B, III. B. 
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2.2.2. Impartiality and Independence 
In addition to nationality restrictions, arbitrators must be 
impartial and independent, and these qualifications are expressed 
in a different, yet similar, way in the rules. As practitioner Noah 
Rubins explains, "independence and impartiality are two distinct 
but interrelated qualifications, required of every arbitrator."65 
Impartiality fundamentally means that an arbitrator "is not 
partial-or biased-in favor of, or against, a particular party or its 
case, while an independent arbitrator is one who has no close 
relationship-financial, professional or personal-with a party or 
its counsel."66 
The qualification of these requirements is at times complex and 
their assessment in practice can be difficult. As observed recently 
by a tribunal rejecting an arbitrator challenge based on alleged lack 
on impartiality, 
[t]he concepts of independence and impartiality, though 
related, are often seen as distinct, although the precise 
nature of the distinction is not always easy to grasp. 
Generally speaking independence relates to the lack of 
relations with a party that may influence an arbitrator's 
decision. Impartiality, on the other hand, concerns the 
absence of a bias or predisposition toward one of the 
parties.67 
Both qualities are necessary for an arbitrator to perform his or 
her adjudicative function. 
Upon constitution of the tribunal, each arbitrator is also 
required to sign a declaration confirming that, to the best of his 
knowledge, there are no reasons why he should not serve as an 
arbitrator, that he will keep confidential all information received 
and that he will "judge fairly as between the parties, according to 
65 Noah Rubins & Bernhard Lauterburg, Independence, Impartiality and Duty of 
Disclosure in Investment Arbitration, in INVESTMENT AND COMMEROAL 
ARBITRATION -SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES 153, 154. (Christina Knahr et al. eds., 
2010) (citation omitted). 
66 Partasides, supra note 36, at 219. 
67 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., & InterAguas 
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the 
Arbitral Tribunal~ 29 (Oct. 22, 2007) (citations omitted). 
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the applicable law, and shall not accept any instruction or 
compensation with regard to the proceedings from any source 
except as provided" by the ICSID Convention.6B 
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976): 
A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who 
approach him in connexion with his possible appointment 
any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as 
to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, once 
appointed or chosen, shall disclose such circumstances to 
the parties unless they have already been informed by him 
of these circumstances.69 
68 ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 49, at r. 6. The full text of the signed 
statements states: 
To the best of my knowledge there is no reason why I should not serve 
on the Arbitral Tribunal constituted by the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes with respect to a dispute between 
__ and __ . I shall keep confidential all information coming to my 
knowledge as a result of my participation in this proceeding, as well as 
the contents of any award made by the Tribunal. I shall judge fairly as 
between the parties, according to the applicable law, and shall not accept 
any instruction or compensation with regard to the proceeding from any 
source except as provided in the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States and in 
the Regulations and Rules made pursuant thereto. Attached is a 
statement of (a) my past and present professional, business and other 
relationships (if any) with the parties and (b) any other circumstance that 
might cause my reliability for independent judgment to be questioned by 
a party. I acknowledge that by signing this declaration, I assume a 
continuing obligation promptly to notify the Secretary-General of the 
Centre of any such relationship or circumstance that subsequently arises 
during this proceeding. 
Id. Each Arbitrator must sign the declaration before or at the first session of the 
Tribunal, failing to do so by the end of the first session of the Tribunal shall be 
deemed tantamount to resignation. 
69 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, at art. 9. UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 11 amended the text of the article to 
state that: 
I d. 
When a person is approached in connection with his or her possible 
appointment as an arbitrator, he or she shall disclose any circumstances 
likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or 
independence. An arbitrator, from the time of his or her appointment 
and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose 
any such circumstances to the parties and the other arbitrators unless 
they have already been informed by him or her of these circumstances. 
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The appointing authority is similarly tasked to have regard for 
considerations that are "likely to secure the appointment of an 
independent and impartial arbitrator."70 Independence and 
impartiality remain difficult to define. As explained in more detail 
below, an arbitrator's subjective biases cannot be known, and can 
only be inferred from his or her conduct.71 There are no objective 
tests that can fully evaluate an arbitrator's personal conduct. 
2.2.3. Legal Expertise and Other Requirements 
Under the ICSID Convention, arbitrators must be persons of 
"recognized competence" in the fields of law, as well as commerce, 
industry, or finance.n A proposal to require arbitrators to be 
lawyers was discussed and rejected during the negotiations of the 
ICSID Convention, as it was deemed to be excessively restrictive.73 
Additionally, it was widely acknowledged that both the parties 
and the appointing authorities take into consideration other 
elements when making their selection. These include legal 
background, knowledge of the specific technical field and of the 
applicable law, and knowledge of the language of the proceeding 
and of the documents.74 
These apparently simple selection methods result in the 
selection of a small group of highly talented international 
arbitrators, who are generally experienced lawyers of high 
70 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, art. 6(4); UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 6(7). 
71 See infra Parts II.A, III. A. 
72 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 14(1). 
73 See KAREL DAELE, CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 84 (2012) (noting that the rules reflect a compromise: 
arbitrators do not have to be lawyers, but must be reasonably competent in the 
field of law). 
74 See Obadia, supra note 48, at 76. Obadia notes that several issues are 
considered when making an appointment, including "language of the 
proceedings, but also of the documents, as it may be different." She also explains 
that, when making appointments 
we also look at availability of the arbitrators ... experience of the 
candidate as an arbitrator, not only in investment arbitration but also in 
commercial arbitration and other types of arbitration ... knowledge of 
the relevant law, which is often public international law, and the 
knowledge of international investment law, which has become more and 
more complex. 
Id. Finally, "the cohesiveness of the tribunal" is also a factor. 
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international standing, often multilingual and capable of handling 
complex cases involving complicated sets of facts, diverse 
applicable law and rules of procedures, and multi-cultural 
parties.75 Most generally, the group is composed of public 
international law academics and international law practitioners. 
The extent of the system's success is a distinct question, which 
is explored in the next part. 
3. DOES ARBITRATOR SELECTION WORK? AN ASSESSMENT 
The international investment arbitrator selection system 
appears straightforward and effective from afar. Certain 
problematic issues become more apparent on closer scrutiny, 
however. First, some practitioners and experts have criticized the 
idea of the party-appointed arbitrator because of the possible built-
in biases in favor of the party that appointed him or her.76 Second, 
critics have focused on the fact that a very small number of 
individuals make up the vast majority of arbitrators and that 
arbitration panels include too many repeat appointments and lack 
diversity.77 
Critics claim that these two flaws fatally undermine decisions 
taken by international investment tribunals and that, as a 
consequence, party-appointments must be eliminated. I address 
these issues below. 
3.1. Criticisms of the Party-Appointment System Based on Innate Bias 
Practitioners and other stakeholders have taken issue with the 
institution of the party-appointed arbitrator.78 The criticisms focus 
on innate biases that arbitrators may have in favor of the party that 
75 See Rogers, The Vocation of International Arbitrators, supra note 37, at 958-59 
(noting that "[i]nternational arbitrators are exceptionally talented individuals" 
with diverse language skills, excellent educational backgrounds, and extensive 
legal experience as well as expertise in other industries; furthermore, "their 
cumulative credentials are frequently parlayed into professorships and enhanced 
by rich scholarly research") (footnotes omitted). 
76 See infra section 3.1. 
77 See infra section 3.2. 
78 Alexis Mourre, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson's 
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appointed them and against the opposing party.79 Critics claim 
that innate biases would result in a propensity of the party-
appointed arbitrator to be too sympathetic to the arguments put 
forth by the appointing party, pressuring other arbitrators to reach 
a solution that is particularly advantageous to that party, or at least 
not too disadvantageous to it.BD The issue is whether party-
appointed arbitrators suffer from inevitable bias: does the very 
nature of party appointment skew their incentives from the start?Bl 
The assessment is difficult. For example, in considering a 
challenge of an arbitrator for alleged lack of impartiality due to the 
arbitrator's prior ruling against the respondent in a similar ICSID 
prior case, the arbitral tribunal in charge of resolving the challenge 
rejected the challenge and acknowledged that: 
Independence and impartiality are states of mind. Neither 
the Respondent, the two members of this tribunal, or any 
other body is capable of probing the inner workings of any 
arbitrator's mind to determine with perfect accuracy 
whether that person is independent and impartial. Such 
state of mind can only be inferred from conduct either by 
the arbitrator in question or persons connected to him or 
her.B2 
The difficulty in assessing the possible lack of impartiality is an 
important criticism.s3 Some specialists and practitioners have 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See David Branson, Sympathetic Party-Appointed Arbitrators: Sophisticated 
Strangers and Gavernments Demand on Them, 25 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 367, 
368 (2010) (noting that party-appointment of arbitrators is subject to 'moral 
hazard' if "one party-appointed arbitrator sees a 'duty' to act for the benefit of the 
appointing party and the other follows the dictates of the law and remains 
neutral, then there is imbalance, the process can be unfair and it can produce 
injustice"). 
82 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., & InterAguas 
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the 
Arbitral Tribunal ~ 30 (Oct. 22, 2007). 
83 See Srnit, supra note 19, at 1 ("Once selected, an arbitrator's personal 
incentive is to secure reemployment by providing his or her party with a 
favorable outcome."). For a discussion of repeating arbitrators, see generally 
Fatima-Zahra Slaoui, The Rising Issue of 'Repeat Arbitrators': A Call for Clarification, 
25 ARB. INT'L 103 (2009) (arguing that the issues of 'repeated appointment' and 
'repeat arbitrator' are in need of more attention and to tackle the issues, more 
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pointed out that a non-neutral arbitrator can disrupt the process in 
several ways including: delaying meetings, refusing to participate 
in proceedings,84 and issuing damaging dissents.ss 
International investment arbitrators themselves are weary of 
the system. For example, the late Hans Smit also acknowledged 
that party-appointed arbitrators could feel pressured to decide in 
favor of the party that appointed them. This sentiment could 
materialize in many forms, including a reluctance to vote against 
the appointing party and a tendency to advocate for reduced 
awards or costs. Smit observed: "The incentive of the party and its 
counsel is to appoint an arbitrator who will win the case for them. 
That incentive will be particularly strong when its case, on its 
merits, is not particularly strong."s6 
He also noted that, 
Even if arbitrators are willing to rule against the party that 
appointed them, there are still ways in which they can 
influence the final outcome of a case to favor their party. 
For example, they may try to persuade the other panel 
members to reduce the award in favor of their party in 
return for joining them in a unanimous award. This 
compromise will ordinarily be attractive to the chair of the 
panel, for his or her reputation for obtai11ing unanimous 
awards may increase the likelihood of being appointed to 
future panels. Even if the award is not affected, the party-
appointed arbitrator may bargain for not awarding counsel 
fees .... It might be argued that these are relatively minor 
disadvantages, that there is virtually always reason for 
compromise and that this is an acceptable price to be paid. 
But it is not only untoward compromises that the 
institution of party-appointed arbitrators promotes. The 
presence of a partisan arbitrator on a panel will normally 
comprehensive definitions of 'repeated appointment' and 'repeat arbitrator' are 
necessary). 
84 NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PART ASIDES, ALAN REDFERN, &J. MARTIN 
HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 320-25 (2009). 
ss Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields- Lecture Dissenting Opinions in 
International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT'L 
223, 242 (2004) (suggesting that arbitrators can be collaborative and fulfill their 
duties with diligence or rebellious and refuse to participate in the proceeding and 
also issuing ugly dissents). 
86 Smit, supra note 19, at 1. 
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reduce, if not eliminate, the free exchange of ideas among 
the members of the panel. The chair will be less receptive 
to arguments that appear to be moved by partisan 
considerations or may join one of the arbitrators, with the 
result that the other party-appointed arbitrators feel 
excluded from the deliberations.87 
457 
Other well-known arbitrators share this sentiment and identify 
the culprit in the party-appointment process. For example, Albert 
Jan van den Berg notes that "[t]he root of the problem is the 
appointment method. Unilateral appointments may create 
arbitrators who may be dependent in some way on the parties that 
appointed them."ss Yves Derains argues that party-appointed 
arbitrators are often too partial and that they can create 
"pathologic" deliberations within the tribunal.B9 Jan Paulsson 
maintains that a party's paramount desire to win results in 
speculation about "ways and means to shape a favorable tribunal 
or at least to avoid a tribunal favorable to the other side." 9o 
Indeed, recent empirical data also show a possible connection 
between the selection and how the case is ultimately resolved. An 
important new study by Waibel and Wu, for example, analyzes 388 
ICSID cases from 1978 to 2011. The study finds that arbitrators 
who are normally appointed by claimants in ICSID cases are more 
likely to affirm jurisdiction, while arbitrators who are often 
appointed by host states in general are less likely to uphold 
87 Id. at 2. 
BB Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FU1URE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 834 (Mahanoush Arsanjani eta!. eds., 
2010). 
89 Yves Derains, Fifth Annual International Commercial Arbitration Lecture: The 
Arbitrator's Deliberation, 27 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 911, 913-919 (2012). 
90 Jan Paulsson, Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein 
Distinguished Scholer Chair at the Miami University School of Law 11 (Apr. 29, 
2010), available at http:/ /www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/ 
paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf. See also Jan Paulsson, Are Unilateral Appointments 
Defensible?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOC, (Apr. 2, 2009), http:/ jkluwerarbitration 
blog.com/ blog/ 2009/04/02/ are-unilateral-appointments-defensible j (criticizing 
the mechanism of appointment of arbitrators by party and suggesting possible 
alternatives, including selection by a neutral institution or the use of list for the 
appointment of all arbitrators, following the example of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport). 
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jurisdiction.91 The authors conclude that "arbitrators who are pro-
investor/pro-host state tend to vote in favour of the investors/host 
state."92 Data also shows that dissenting opinions are more often 
produced by arbitrators appointed by the losing party in the 
arbitration. Indeed, this is the case in nearly all the cases 
surveyed.93 
3.2. Criticisms of the Party-Appointment System Based on the Lack of 
Diversity 
Aside from possible systemic biases, a chief complaint of party-
selected arbitrators is their limited number and demographic 
characteristics. Indeed, arbitrators have been typecast as "pale, 
male and stale."94 
Newly available data analyzed the profile of those who have 
been selected to sit on international investment tribunals, taking 
into consideration gender, nationality, professional background, 
legal education, and method of appointment. These data 
empirically support some of the anecdotal unease associated with 
international arbitration, painting a picture of a system which is 
not diverse or representative, and where the same few people tend 
to be reappointed time and again.9s 
91 See Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 34-35 (concluding that data show that: 
(1) female arbitrators, arbitrators who also act as counsel and those with 
experience in international organizations are more likely to affirm jurisdiction; (2) 
arbitrators from developing countries are more likely to decline jurisdiction; (3) 
arbitrators from the same legal family as the host country are less likely to affirm 
liability; and (4) those with experience in international organizations and those 
that have served often as presidents are more likely to affirm liability). 
92 Id. at 36. For a slightly older, but thorough analysis of the voting behavior 
of ICSID arbitrators, see Rogerio Carmona Bianco, The International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID): An Empirical Research on the Voting 
Behavior of Arbitrators (Working Paper, 2009) available at http:/ /papers. 
ssm.comjsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1514882 (analyzing the voting behaviors 
of ICSID arbitrators based on empirical data collected from ICSID). 
93 van den Berg, supra note 88, at 824-25. 
94 See Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Presidente: A Woman Who Sits As 
President of a Major Arbitral Tribunal Is a Rare Creature. Why?, AM. LAW: Focus EUR. 
(2004) ("Arbitration is dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered 
the field. In the words of Sarah Fran<;ois-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are 
'pale, male, and stale."'). 
95 See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 17, at 437 (stating that 
national origin of arbitrators impacts results of arbitration). 
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The most recent ICSID statistics show that 68% of all 
appointments in cases registered and administered by ICISD are 
from Western Europe and North America.96 Conversely, only 
about 6% of all cases registered under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules include a State Party from North America 
or Western Europe.97 Interestingly, although about 85% of the 
cases are brought by an investor from a developed country against 
a developing country, only about one third of the arbitrators come 
from developing countries.98 
An analysis of gender representation shows an even more 
striking lack of diversity.99 As of May 2010, only 6.5% of all 
arbitrators appointed in investment treaty arbitration were 
women.1oo Disappointingly, the percentage actually falls to 5.63% 
96 These include 704 arbitrators appointed by parties and 230 appointed by 
ICSID. ICSID Caseload Statistics, supra note 1, at 18-19 (showing that the 
appointment of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc Committee Members appointed 
in cases registered under the ICSID Convention and the Additional Facility Rules 
were geographically distributed as follows: forty-six percent Western Europe; 
twenty-two percent North America (Canada, Mexico and the United States); 
eleven percent South America; ten percent South and East Asia and the Pacific; 
five percent Middle East and North Africa and two percent each from Central 
America & the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
97 Id. at 11 (showing the following geographical distribution all ICSID cases 
by State Party Involved: one percent Western Europe; five percent North America 
(Canada, Mexico and the United States); thirty percent South America; nine 
percent South & East Asia & the Pacific; ten percent Middle East and North 
Africa; six percent Central America and the Caribbean and sixteen percent Sub-
Saharan Africa). 
98 Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 27. 
99 The paucity of international women judges is common in international 
courts and tribunals and has been subject of several recent interesting studies. See 
Grossman, supra note 28; see also LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., LCHR's CHART 
SHOWING GENDER AND REGIONAL BALANCE IN ELECfiONS TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS, available at http:/ jwww.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/ pdf/judges_gender_region_040303.pdf (interfering that women 
make up only about five percent of the total appointments). 
100 Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 59, 2012, at 1. available at 
http://www. vcc.columbia.edu/ content/ lack-women-arbitrators-investment-
treaty-arbitration ("In 249 known investment treaty cases until May 2010, there 
were 631 appointments. Of these, 41 were appointments of women-just 6.5% of 
all appointments. Worse, of the 247 individuals appointed as arbitrators across all 
cases, only 10 were women. Women thus comprised 4% of those serving as 
arbitrators. The story is also almost entirely that of two women, Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kahler and Brigitte Stern, who together captured 75% of appointments 
of women. In contrast, the two most frequently appointed men accounted for 5% 
of the 593 appointments of male arbitrators."). See also Franck, Empirically 
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when considering ICSID's more recent appointmentsJDl 
Significantly, 75% of all female arbitrator appointments went to 
two women; thus without counting their appointments, the 
percentage of women arbitrators would be even lower.1D2 It is also 
worth noting that, counter-intuitively, women account for only 
3.49% of appointments made by the Chairman of the 
Administrative Counsel of ICSID for all ad hoc annulment 
committee members appointed since 2008_103 
Additionally, few repeat players seem to dominate the field. 
For example, almost 20% of all arbitrators selected in the cases 
decided on the merits by ICSID in the 1994-2009 period were 
appointed at least four times.104 Moreover, often repeat players 
inter-change roles, acting both as counsel and arbitrators, which 
compound their impact in the field. 
These data give support to the concern expressed in recent 
discussion as to whether, given the lack of diversity that results 
from party-selection, the existing selection procedures result in the 
selection of the best decision makers.1D5 The lack of diversity 
becomes more important as arbitrators are deciding more complex 
and public policy cases, in which a wide variety of viewpoints 
would be particularly beneficial. 
Indeed, investment arbitration has fallen victim to its own 
success, drawing criticism regarding the elitist and partial nature 
Evaluating Claims, supra note 17, at 81 (commenting on the surprisingly small 
number of women in arbitration relative to other similar professions). 
1o1 C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Getting a Better Balance on International 
Arbitration Tribunals, 27 ARB. INT'L 653, 655 (2012). 
102 See Irene Ten Cate, Binders Full of Women ... Arbitrators?, INTLAWGRRLS, 
(Nov. 2, 2012), http:/ fwww.intlawgrrls.com/2012/11/binders-full-of-women-
arbitrators.html (reporting that Brigitte Stern was appointed 51.61% of the time 
and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kahler 22.58%). 
103 Id. ("One might expect to encounter more women in annulment 
committees, whose members are appointed by the Chairman of the 
Administrative Counsel of ICSID. After all, doesn't ICSID have greater incentives 
than parties to consider gender balance? Perhaps not. Women account for only 
3.49% of annulment committee members appointed since 2008."). 
104 Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decisions 
Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47,73 (2010). 
105 Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 475 (stating that the perceived 
shortcoming of investment arbitration - including the ad hoc appointment of 
arbitrators -have led to call for the replacement or "radical redesign of investor-
state dispute-settlement mechanisms"). 
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of the processJ06 Concerns about party-appointment of arbitrators 
ultimately question whether existing selection procedures produce 
the best decision makers.1D7 Suggestions to better international 
investment arbitration should be carefully considered. However, 
as I will explain next, the call for a drastic change in the selection 
procedures is premature and is hardly warranted, given the fact 
that there are other ways to strengthen the arbitrators' selection 
procedures. 
3.3. Responding to Criticisms: Why Party-Appointments Should 
Remain 
The combination of new data, intense criticism, increased 
awareness, and practice of international investment arbitration has 
resulted in a call for a reassessment and modification of the 
practice of party-appointmentsJOS Despite criticisms by both 
experts and practitioners, party-appointment is a sound choice for 
international investment arbitration and should be maintained for 
a number of reasons. Parties support it, and there are good policy 
reasons to maintain it. Additionally, there are procedural 
safeguard in place to protect it from possible abuse, which could, 
as proposed, be also further strengthened. 
106 See e.g., PIA EBERHARDT & CECIUA OuvET, TRANSNAT'L INST. & CoRP. EuR. 
OBSERVATORY, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND 
FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (2012), available at 
http:/ j corporateeurope.org/ sites/ default/ files/publications/ profiting-from-
injustice.pdf (arguing that a "small club of international law firms, arbitrators and 
financial speculators are fuelling an investment arbitration boom that is costing 
taxpayers billions of dollars and preventing legislation in the public interest"). 
107 Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 474-475. 
1os See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 7 (advocating for a method of 
appointment of judges for a set term to make judges independent). See also 
Paulsson, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible?, supra note 90 (criticizing the 
mechanism of appointment of arbitrators by party and suggesting possible 
alternatives, including selection by a neutral institution or the use of list for the 
appointment of all arbitrators, following the example of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport); Hans Smit, supra note 90 (stating that party-appointed arbitrators are 
often unable to provide the objectivity demanded by the position). See generally 
Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. L. 
Inaugural Con£., Working Paper No. 22/08, 2008), available at http:/ jssm.com 
/ abstract=l153424 and http:// dx.doi.org/10.2139 j ssrn.1153424 (arguing for an 
alternative to the existing system of investment treaty arbitration measured 
against criteria that normally apply in public law). 
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3.3.1. There Are No Good Alternatives 
International investment arbitration is the culmination of a 
very delicate and carefully-negotiated process. As Professor 
Michael Reisman eloquently notes, "[p]robably no arbitral 
institution ... better captures the curious convergence of dissimilar 
interests of governments, foreign investors and international 
institutions than the Washington Agreement of 1965, which 
produced the International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes."109 International investment arbitration offers a unique 
and indispensable dispute resolution mechanism to resolve 
disputes between a state and investor, and as such, it provides an 
important and useful service to both investors and states. 
The balance of interests achieved by the international 
investment process, moreover, would be difficult to recreate in any 
alternative situation. None of the recent proposals that call for a 
change in the party-selection system provide a feasible alternative. 
For example, Paulsson suggests that arbitrators should be either 
selected by a neutral authority or should only be selected from a 
pre-approved list.110 However, having a neutral authority select all 
the arbitrators would change completely the balance of interests 
negotiated by the parties, while not ensuring that the neutral 
authority does not take into consideration the diverse interests 
represented by each party. Similarly, selecting from a pre-
approved list would not guarantee the absence of biases any more 
than the present system. Instead, it would only anticipate the 
selection of preferred arbitrators by the party while further 
restricting the number of available candidates. 
Smit suggested that "party-appointed arbitrators should be 
banned unless their role as advocates for the party that appointed 
them is fully disclosed and accepted."111 However, while each 
party is indeed fully aware of the role played by each arbitrator 
and is cognizant of who selected whom, the role of arbitrator is 
109 Reisman, supra note 22, at 236 (observing that "[p]robably no arbitral 
institution in contemporary international arbitration better captures the curious 
convergence of dissimilar interests of governments, foreign investors and 
international institutions than the Washington Agreement of 1965, which 
produced the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes"). 
no Paulsson, supra note 19, at 348. 
m Smit, supra note 19, at 1. 
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very different than that of an advocate, and is instead that of an 
adjudicator. 
Gus Van Harten suggests the creation of a permanent 
international investment court.112 The reality is that it would be 
just impossible to negotiate the creation of another permanent 
court and to find the will and interest to negotiate the creation of a 
new institution. Further, nominations of judges in international 
courts are not simple, apolitical processes.113 The same balance of 
different views will be found in a permanent investment court. 
Complete overhaul of the system to eliminate party-appointed 
arbitrators is also practically unfeasible. Changing the dispute 
resolution clause would not only require a renegotiation of the 
ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Model law, it would also 
require the renegotiation and redrafting of the innumerable BITs 
and investment protection treaties that include a dispute resolution 
clause that provides for the selection by the parties and by a 
neutral appointing authority.114 Realistically, moreover, as Veeder 
suggests "the fact is that most institutions cannot at present be 
trusted with any arbitral appointments not made with the prior 
informed consent of all parties."m 
Indeed, often, there is just "no alternative to arbitration."116 
Judge 0. Thomas Johnson concludes: 
[t]he alternative to compulsory investor-State arbitration is 
either compulsory State-to-State arbitration, which requires 
the claimant State either to take an adversarial posture with 
respect to the host State or to leave its injured national 
112 See VAN HARTEN, supra note 7, at 180-84 (arguing for a new method for 
appointing judges). See generally Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International 
Investment Court, supra note 103. 
113 Mackenzie eta!., supra note 29. 
114 Parties to investment arbitration have clarified their preference for 
participating in the selection process of arbitrators, as this is of paramount 
importance for the choice to go to arbitration. A change to permanent judiciary 
would undermine the arbitration system. 
115 V.V. Johnny Veeder, Inaugural International Arbitration Lecture in Honor 
of Charles Brower, 107th ASIL Annual Meeting (Apr. 5, 2013). 
116 David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the 
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 116 
(1990) ("On the municipal level, arbitration is attractive because it is perceived to 
a desirable alternative to the courts. But on the international level, there often is 
no alternative to arbitration. In many international situations, neither party will 
agree to submit all possible disputes to the courts of the other."). 
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without a remedy, or direct diplomatic and/ or economic 
intervention by the claimant State. It is difficult to imagine 
a foreign minister of either a capital-importing or a capital-
exporting country who would welcome any of these 
alternatives.ll7 
This system is needed because there is no other alternative 
forum where parties agree to bring their international investment 
disputes. 
In the end, we may be just asking arbitrators to be impossibly 
unaffected by the world around them, while also defining bias too 
loosely. As Professor Susan Franck argues: 
[m]odern international arbitration requires the objective 
application of rules to facts and the exercise of bounded 
discretion to ensure that the process and final outcome is 
warranted. While parties may pick arbitrators with 
particular cultural and legal backgrounds and specific 
personal experiences, arbitrators also generally have an 
obligation to disclose those matters that would call into 
question their independence. Although all humans are 
inevitably influenced by their experiences, in international 
arbitration, parties ask arbitrators to put aside biases in 
order to fairly and impartially exercise their independent 
judgment and apply their expertise to the facts on the 
record to render a decision based upon the law.118 
That ability to fairly decide a dispute without being influenced 
by external factors is the core ability of an international arbitrator. 
At its core, international investment arbitration is a system that 
combines aspects of international public law and commercial law 
to create a unique system. This system relies on party-
appointment. Getting rid of party appointment would 
denaturalize the core of international investment arbitration and 
transform it into a different system. As it is explained below, what 
could initially be seen as a downside is indeed an upside for 
international investment arbitration, because it provides a strong 
117 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to BITs: The 
Evolution of Modern International Investment Law, 2010/2011 Y.B. ON INT'L 
INVESTMENT L. & PoL'Y (Vale Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Int'l Inv., Karl P. 
Sauvant ed.) 692. 
ns Franck, supra note 37, at 505-07 (footnotes omitted). 
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support to a voluntary system by all the main participants. Both 
parties have a strong interest in upholding and respecting 
decisions of an arbitral tribunal, which they played a part in 
selecting. 
3.3.2. Party Preference for Party-Appointments 
The possibility of choosing their own arbitrators is a key reason 
why parties, both investors and states, agree and elect to arbitrate. 
Rogers notes that "[e]mpirical studies consistently verify that 
parties' ability to select arbitrators is one of the primary reasons 
they select arbitration as a means of dispute resolution."119 In 
October 2012, the School of International Arbitration at Queen 
Mary, University of London and White & Case released the results 
of the "2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and 
Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process," a global survey on 
practices in international arbitration which comprised responses 
from more than 700 practitioners. 12o The survey showed that 
seventy-six percent of respondents preferred selection of two co-
arbitrators by each party unilaterally in a three-member arbitral 
tri bunal.121 
While users' support is always important, it is particularly 
relevant for international investment arbitration. International 
investment arbitration seeks to find a solution in a dispute where 
parties- a state and an investor- have diametrically different 
interests. The fact that they could agree on a dispute resolution 
system capable of converging and resolving such dissimilar 
interests, and thus eventually in the resulting award, is an 
achievement worth protecting.122 
119 Rogers, supra note 27. 
120 SCH. OF INT'L ARBITRATION AT QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON & WHITE & 
CASE, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CURRENT AND PREFERRED 
PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS 2 (2012), available at http:/ /arbitration. 
practicallaw.com/6-522-2998. For a short overview and commentary on the 
study, see John Templeman, The 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Looking 
Behind the Closed Doors of International Arbitration, PRACTICAL L. Co. (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http:/ f uk.practicallaw.com/ cs/Satellite/ about/5-522-2994. 
121 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY, supra note 120, at 2. 
122 See Bjorklund, supra note 25, at 1300 ("The burgeoning emphasis on 
transparency and public participation is at once a response to the public's 
fascination with investment arbitration and a facilitator of that fascination; 
international commercial arbitration, a largely private endeavor, has never 
captured public interest to the same extent."). 
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As Professor Andreas Lowenfeld explains "one of the principal 
functions of a party-appointed arbitrator is to give confidence in 
the process to the parties and their counsel .... "123 Party-
appointed arbitrators are nominated with the expectation that they 
understand the party's position and they may be well predisposed 
to it.124 This must not, and does not, equate to bias.m Parties make 
a selection and appoint an arbitrator who is 'philosophically' 
inclined to decide along the views of the claimant or of the 
respondent. Thus, an arbitrator does not decide in a certain way 
because of the specific appointment by a party, but because he or 
she shares the same Weltanschauung as the party that appointed 
them. This also explains (and justifies) the time and money spent 
on the selection of arbitrators and the propensity for repeated (and 
safer) appointments.126 A well-prepared party can ensure that he 
or she selects an arbitrator that has a certain predisposition to 
issues that are important to the appointing party.127 As Claudia 
Salomon advises when choosing an arbitrator, parties should 
"[c]hoose [a]n [i]mpartial, [b]ut [k]nown [p]arty-[a]ppointed 
[ a]rbitrator."12s 
123 See Lowenfeld, supra note 43, at 62 ("Sometimes that confidence can be 
based on mutual acquaintances, without direct personal contact; some potential 
arbitrators become well-known through published writings, lectures, committee 
work, or public office. Others are not so well known, and I understand that 
lawyers or clients or both want to have a firsthand look. I think, however, some 
restraint should be shown by both sides."). 
124 See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 58 ARBITRATION 219, 
223 (1987) ("[W]hen I am representing a client in an arbitration, what I am really 
looking for in a party-nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum 
predisposition towards my client, but with the minimum appearance of bias."). 
12s Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional 
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 56 (2005) ("[T]he 
mirage of absolute judicial impartiality becomes more distorted when it is 
superimposed onto the arbitrator."). 
126 Rogers highlights the importance, in this context, of information 
asymmetry and advocates for the creation of an "Arbitrators Information Project" 
to provide information related to arbitrators to both parties equally. Catherine A. 
Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http:/ /digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ 
globalevents/ investment/ symposia/3. 
127 See Hunter, supra note 124. 
128 Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to 
Consider, MEALEYS INT'L ARB. REP., Oct. 2002, at 2, available at 
http:/ jwww.arbitralwomen.org/filesjpublication/0405202743129.pdf. 
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A case that is often cited as a demonstration of a possible 
arbitrator bias is Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States.129 The case 
involved a Canadian inventor who brought a case under NAFTA 
against the United States for denial of justice by Mississippi courts, 
which had found against him in a $3 million transaction and 
awarded $400 million in punitive damages and $75 million for 
emotional distress.130 Loewen was unable to appeal because he did 
not have sufficient funds to post the $625 million bond required 
(125% of the judgment).131 The case bankrupted the Canadian 
company.132 The NAFTA Tribunal found that "the conduct of the 
trial judge was so flawed as to constitute a miscarriage of justice" 
but denied jurisdiction over Loewen for lack of nationality.133 In a 
symposium held after the award was made public, the arbitrator 
that the Respondent had appointed, a federal judge, recounted that 
he had met officials of the U.S. Department of Justice prior to 
accepting the appointment; the officials had told him that, if the 
United States lost the case, "we could lose NAFTA."134 The 
arbitrator remembered replying "[w]ell, if you want to put 
pressure on me, then that does it."Bs 
At first reading, this case appears very troubling because it 
seems to demonstrate that pressure was exercised towards one of 
the arbitrators, who seemed to be inclined to give in to the 
pressure. On a deeper analysis, however, we may be reading too 
much into the reported discussion, especially because it is 
interpreted with the knowledge of how the case was finally 
disposed, which has been widely criticized.136 In fact, the 
arbitrator's narration shows that the party interviewed him prior to 
the selection as the arbitrator.137 There are no suggestions of 
129 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Award Gune 26, 2003). 
130 Id. ~~ 3-4. 
131 Id. ~~5-6. 
132 Id. ~ 29. 
133 Id. ~ 54, ~~ 234-36. For a detailed analysis of the Loewen case, see Jan 
Paulsson, Inaugural Lecture, supra note 90. 
134 Paulsson, supra note 90, at 6. 
135 Id. 
136 For a thoughtful discussion of this case, see Veeder, supra note 115. See 
also V. V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three 
Ideas, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 755 (1998). 
137 Veeder, supra note 115. 
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improper discussion with the Department of Justice after his 
appointment to the panel. Moreover, although the U.S. arbitrator 
was privy to the general knowledge about the Loewen case's 
importance to the future of NAFTA, he did not seem to discuss any 
of the specifics of the case. The arbitrator's reply was similarly 
general and non-committal. 
What the case does show, however, is that what may seem 
normal to a U.S. practitioner, namely the pre-appointment meeting 
of counsel with possible arbitrators, may seem objectionable to a 
non-U.S. practitioner. The different ethics standards and the lack 
of guidance thereof is an important issue. As I will explain below, 
it should be properly addressed in order to strengthen investment 
arbitration. 
Another recent decision rejecting an arbitrator's challenge 
highlights the difficulties in assessing behavior and reinforces the 
need for more guidance on ethical issues. In Urbaser S.A. v. The 
Argentine Republic, the remaining two members of an ICSID 
Tribunal were called upon to decide a challenge by Argentina 
based on academic writings of the challenged arbitrator, which 
Argentina claimed had demonstrated a pre-judgment of certain 
important issues.BB The Tribunal concluded that: 
No arbitrator and, more generally, no human being of a 
certain age is, in absolute terms, independent and impartial. 
Simply put, every individual is conveying ideas and 
opinions based on its moral, cultural, and professional 
education and experience. What is required, when it comes 
to rendering judgment in a legal dispute, is the ability to 
consider and evaluate the merits of each case, without 
relying on factors having no relation to such merits,139 
International investment arbitration is a complex system where 
actors are sophisticated. Manifest or obvious bias will be very 
rarely found. The requirement of an absolute tabula rasa for 
arbitrators may just be unachievable. All decision-makers have 
their own experiences and ideas, which inform their decision. This 
138 Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /26, 
Decision on Claimants' Proposal to Disqualify Professor Campbell McLachlan, 
Arbitrator, ~ 40 (Aug. 12, 2010). 
139 Id. ~~ 20-25. 
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does not result in biased decisions, however_140 Sacerdoti notes 
that: 
Empirical evidence from the rejection of most 
disqualification requests confirms that the great majority of 
arbitrators are serious professionals who take care and 
pride in being independent and impartial. If a party-
appointed arbitrator is biased he or she will end up in the 
minority. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong if such 
an arbitrator shares in good faith the position of the party 
who has made the appointment.141 
Experienced arbitrators have no difficulties evaluating the 
merits of each case and will disregard other factors that have no 
bearing with the merits of the case. Arbitrators are not agents of 
the parties that appointed them, but rather are adjudicators who 
have to decide the dispute fairly.142 
A party preference for a system, of course, is not by itself 
sufficient to maintain a system if it is faulty. In addition to parties' 
preferences, there are other important reasons to support party-
appointment of arbitrators. 
3.3.3. Party-appointment is an Essential Element of International 
Investment Arbitration 
Another key argument in favor of party-appointment relies on 
the very nature of international investment arbitration as a dispute 
resolution process that is distinct from adjudication by 
permanent- either domestic or international- courts.143 
140 Id. ~ 40. For example, compare the discussions about the experience and 
political views of Supreme Court Justices, which inform their decisions but do not 
condition them. 
141 Giorgio Sacerdoti, Is the Party-Appointed Arbitrator a "Pernicious 
Institution"? A Reply to Professor Hans Smit, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 35, 2011, at 1, 
available at http:/ jwww.vcc.columbia.edu/ content/ party-appointed-arbitrator-
pernicious-institution-reply-professor-hans-smit. 
142 Id. (writing that rather than being "agents of the parties appointing them," 
arbitrators are "trustees"). 
143 See BLACKABY, ET AL., supra note 84, at 313 (2009) ("An arbitral tribunal 
established to determine an international commercial dispute operates in an 
entirely different context from a judge sitting irl a national court. Judges sit irl a 
legal environment that clearly defines the extent of their powers and duties. They 
are generally given full immunity in respect of any potential liability arising out of 
the conduct of their judicial function. Their jurisdiction, and the extent to which 
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Arbitration is a more neutral setting than what is found in 
international or domestic courts of either the investor or the State. 
Indeed, the importance of depoliticizing investment disputes was 
among the factors that prompted the creation of ICSID-an 
international forum where such disputes could be brought.144 
International arbitration, moreover, allows parties to agree on 
basic issues of applicable law, jurisdiction, language, and 
procedural rules. The selection of arbitrators, and the possibility of 
selecting an arbitrator that has specific characteristics of expertise, 
education, language capacity, or background, is a fundamental 
feature of international investment arbitration and part and parcel 
of the parties' autonomy.t45 In tum, the parties' trust in the process 
makes their eventual enforcement of the award more likely. 
The suggested radical change to a selection procedure that 
eliminates party-appointed arbitrators would undermine the 
arbitration system and erode parties' support for arbitration in the 
first place.146 Indeed, a party's traditional right to appoint an 
arbitrator is, as distinguished arbitrator V.V. Veeder said, "a genie 
decisions in relation to jurisdiction may be reviewed by an appellate court, are 
clearly established in the law governing the proceedings. The position differs in 
arbitration, particularly in international arbitration, where the powers, duties, and 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal arise from a complex mixture of the will of the 
parties, the law governing the arbitration agreement, the law of the place of 
arbitration, and the law of the place where recognition or enforcement of the 
award may be sought."). 
144 See Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 2 ("Investors sometimes bring large 
claims in relation to the budgets of the respondent states, in many cases 
developing countries. The findings of the tribunal may require major adjustment 
to public policy."). 
145 See Joseph M. Matthews, Difficult Transitions Do Not Always Require Major 
Adjustment- It's Not Time to Abandon Party-Nominated Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitration, 25 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 356, 359 (2010) (finding that 
the roles of arbitrators in investment arbitration are: 1. to seek the truth about 
what happened; 2. to set specific reasonable expectations for the parties and to 
reject unreasonable ones; 3. to help along a fair finding of the fact and the law; and 
4. to maintain overall confidence in the arbitral tribunal). 
146 Note that parties' preference for appointing one arbitrator is rooted in the 
history of international arbitration. In fact, the first modern international 
arbitration involving States arose out of the 1794 Jay Treaty between the United 
Kingdom and the newly independent United States. The treaty provided for the 
establishment of several commissions consisting of one or two 
commissioners/ arbitrators nominated by the each party, with the third or fifth 
commissioner being chosen by agreement of the parties or by drawing lots. See 
REED ET AL., supra note 44, at 65-66. 
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that cannot easily be put back into the bottle."147 Once the parties 
are given the choice, it would be virtually impossible to reverse 
course. 
3.3.4. Procedural Safeguards Exist to Protect the System 
Additionally, by and large, there are several official and 
unofficial tools to ensure that choice of an arbitrator by the parties 
is fair and not abused.148 First, rules of procedure of the selected 
institutions provide the initial guideposts that monitor the 
selection of arbitrators by the parties.149 The rules set limits on 
party autonomy and require arbitrators to possess certain 
threshold qualities. The nationality requirement, which bars 
parties from selecting arbitrators who are their nationals, is a good 
example of a guidepost. Further, arbitrators are required to 
generally be impartial and independent. They must disclose 
situations giving rise to potential conflicts of interest, and make 
sworn statements declaring that they will judge "fairly as between 
the parties."lso If and when the rules are insufficient to guarantee 
that the arbitration selection process works, they should be 
amended as necessary, which is argued and elaborated in the next 
section of this article. 
In addition to explicit procedural rules, unwritten checks and 
balances also preserve the independence and neutrality of 
arbitrators.1s1 Primarily, arbitrators face reputational costs if they 
147 V.V. Vedeer, Inaugural Lecture in Honor of Charles Brower, supra note 115. 
148 BLACKABY Er AL., supra note 143, at 313-14 (describing well the challenge 
arguing that a "balance must be struck between the sanctions that may be 
imposed on arbitrators who carry out their functions in a careless or improper 
manner, and the equally necessary requirement that an arbitral tribunal should be 
able to perform its task without consistently 'looking over its shoulder' in fear of 
being challenged through legal process. On one view, it may be argued that 
arbitrators should be given virtually unlimited powers, in order to adapt the 
process to the dispute in question and encourage speed and effectiveness in the 
arbitral process; but the requirement of public policy, whether national or 
international, make some control necessary so as to ensure that the parties are not 
without recourse if there is wrongful conduct on the part of an arbitral tribunal. 
In particular, it is considered critical that an arbitral tribunal give the parties a fair 
hearing and that it decide only matters within its competence, or jurisdiction") 
(footnotes omitted). 
149 Sacerdoti, supra note 141. 
150 ICSID RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS RULE 6 (2006). 
151 See Franck, supra note 37, at 516-18 (arguing that there are three different 
market forces which can remedy arbitrators' misconduct: 1. professional word of 
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demonstrate lack of independence or impartiality.152 International 
arbitrators are selected by parties or neutral appointing authorities 
after much vetting and thought, and rely intensely on their 
reputation for thoughtfulness and fair judgment in order to be 
selected. 
An arbitrator who gains a reputation for supporting the 
positions of the party that appointed him or her will quickly 
become ineffective and will not be re-appointed.153 First, sjhe will 
become ineffective as a member of the arbitral tribunal because the 
other two arbitrators on the Tribunal will identify and sideline an 
arbitrator if he or she 'acts as counsel.' An arbitrator who is 
perceived as biased has less power in deliberations.154 Second, a 
non-neutral arbitrator will not be appointed to sit in future 
arbitrations.1ss Indeed, Charles Brower calls the party-selection of 
arbitrators the "ultimate meritocracy" because an arbitrator's 
behavior is continuously scrutinized for potential appointments 
and "he is somewhere in the world always up for re-election."l56 
mouth in the arbitration marketplace; 2. market-based incentives which can create 
financial incentives to behave appropriately; and 3. institutional incentives that 
can establish certain consequences for improper conduct). 
152 See e.g. Rogers, The Vocation of International Arbitrators, supra note 37, at 974 
(stating that "[r]eputational sanctions are another form of control frequently 
proposed as an alternative to formal regulation" and arguing that this may not be 
sufficient given the information asymmetries that exist in the system). 
153 See Lowenfeld, supra note 43, at 60 (arguing that overzealous party-
appointed arbitrators lose credibility with the other members of the tribunal). 
154 See Swigart, supra note 63, at 229 ("[O]ne current [ICJ] judge ad hoc, 
speaking confidentially, lamented that, in fact, members of the regular bench 
assume that he is biased in favor of the state that appointed him and consequently 
do not take his views seriously. He added that other judges ad hoc in his 
acquaintance have felt the same way- their colleagues on the bench do not value 
their views and draft judgments."). 
155 See Franck, Role of International Arbitrators, supra note 37, at 516-17 ("The 
internal arbitrator marketplace, where professional credibility and word-of-mouth 
recommendations affect appointment and re-appointment of arbitrators, plays a 
significant role. Arbitrators can earn hundreds of thousands of dollars from a 
single arbitration and gain personal prestige from having been involved in 
significant case. For those 'repeat-players,' reputation and credibility as a fair, 
independent and reasoned decision maker is vital. In multimillion and multi-
billion dollar disputes, parties are likely to be unwilling to appoint an arbitrator 
who is likely to be challenged, who cannot fully consider fully the facts and laws 
at issue and who may be incapable of rendering an enforceable award.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
156 Judge Charles N. Brower, Remarks at the Leading Figures in International 
Dispute Resolution Series- The Future Of International Arbitration: Is The Past 
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What is more, certain group dynamics are common and 
intrinsic. Complex decision-making by an arbitral tribunal does 
not differ substantially from group decisions by permanent judges 
or by other groups of decision-makers.157 An experienced 
president of the arbitral tribunal will know how to manage the 
discussion. He or she will spot a non-neutral arbitrator fast, and 
will take that into consideration and act accordingly during 
deliberations. This is one of the reasons why the choice of the 
president of the arbitral tribunal is a fundamental one for the 
parties,158 
Further, each party appoints an arbitrator. Thus, each party is 
equally represented during the proceedings and deliberation. 
There is a presumption of equality of arms. During the 
proceedings, an arbitrator may want to assist the tribunal with 
understanding the view of the party that appointed him or her. An 
arbitrator who does that excessively, however, will quickly 
undermine his or her power during deliberations. 
Ultimately, moreover, an arbitrator who is not impartial and 
independent can be challenged during the proceedings. An award 
that is given by an impartial arbitrator can be submitted to 
challenge and annulment review .159 It is therefore of fundamental 
importance, as will be seen below, that challenge procedures are 
fair, effective, and expeditious. 
In sum, the investment arbitration system is not in need of the 
complete transformation that eliminating party-appointment 
would bring. The appointment of arbitrators by the parties is 
justified and is an indispensable part of its process. In the great 
majority of cases, parties endorse an arbitration result and 
willingly enforce awards, which ultimately demonstrates 
arbitration success. 
When parties are not satisfied, mechanisms of appeal and 
redress exist as further protections. There is no need for a major 
overall reform of international investment arbitration to eliminate 
party-appointed arbitrators. Rather, it is possible to build a better 
Prologue? Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals, AM. Soc. OF INT'L L. 
Gan. 17, 2013), http://www.asil.org/conversation-judge-charles-n-brower-future-
international-arbitration. 
157 Rogers, supra note 126. 
158 Id. 
159 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 52. 
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system by strengthening the existing rules. Two proposals to 
enhance the international investment system are discussed below. 
4. STRENGTHENING ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCEDURES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
Investment arbitration has proven to be a reliable, efficient 
mechanism to resolve complex international disputes. Now that 
the reasons to preserve party-appointment of arbitrators have been 
laid out, it is necessary to also address the specific criticisms of lack 
of diversity and innate bias to minimize their downsides. These 
important questions are addressed in this section. 
The need is to recalibrate and make targeted adjustments to a 
system that otherwise works.t6o Necessary changes can be 
obtained by, first, adopting different challenges rules to arbitrator 
selection and by, second, modifying the arbitrator selection 
mechanisms to ensure diversity. 
4.1. Ensuring Impartiality (and Legitimacy) By Adopting Different 
Challenge Rules 
As discussed above, critics express concerns that party-
appointments of arbitrators may lead arbitrators to harbor bias. I 
have assessed above the safeguards that exist during the selection 
process to guarantee the appointment of qualifies arbitrators. It is 
also important to ensure that similar safeguards exist if one of the 
parties questions the impartiality of an appointed arbitrator. 
If a party believes that one of the appointed arbitrators lacks 
the qualities required to perform the function of arbitrator and is 
biased or partial, robust challenge procedures must exist. Strong 
challenge procedures not only address and resolve parties' 
concerns, but also consolidate the arbitrators' selection system and 
generally strengthen international investment arbitration as an 
effective dispute resolution option. 
Existing challenge procedures are not always effective. This is 
particularly true under the ICSID rules. Indeed, ICSID challenge 
procedures are deficient both procedurally and in terms of the 
applicable threshold for challenge. First, under ICSID procedure, 
decisions on disqualification proposals are taken by the remaining 
members of the Tribunal, or, in the case of a proposal to disqualify 
160 Rogers, supra note 125. 
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the sole arbitrator or majority of the arbitrators, by the 
Chairman.161 Second, challenge proposals must be based on a 
"manifest lack of [the] qualities" that are required to serve as an 
arbitrator, a standard hard to meet. Cumulatively, these two 
requirements make the threshold for a successful challenge very 
difficult and are, in practice, ineffective. Indeed, of the thirty 
disqualification proposals so far decided according to ICSID 
procedures, all were dismissed but one.162 Additionally, in ICSID 
arbitration "no arbitrator has ever been disqualified by the other 
members of the tribunal."163 
Under the normal ICSID proceedings, when one arbitrator is 
challenged, the two remaining members of the Tribunal sit in 
judgment of the challenge of the third member of the arbitral 
tribunal, as it happened in the recent Decision on the Proposal to 
Disqualify an Arbitrator in ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela.l64 The 
challenge was brought by Venezuela after claimant-appointed 
arbitrator informed the Secretary General of ICSID of certain facts 
related to a forthcoming merger of his firm with a firm that acted 
against Venezuela in the past, and of which he had just learned.16S 
The regular ICSID proceeding was thus suspended until the 
challenge was resolved. The remaining members of the Tribunal 
asked both parties and the challenged arbitrator to comment on the 
challenge and finally rejected it.J66 
161 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 58 ("The decision on any proposal 
to disqualify a conciliator or arbitrator shall be taken by the other members of the 
Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those members 
are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole conciliator or 
arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or arbitrators, the Chairman shall take 
that decision. If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded the conciliator or 
arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall be replaced in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or Section 2 of Chapter IV."). See also id., at 
r. 9 (detailing the procedure for disqualifying an arbitrator). 
162 KAREL DAELE, CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 84 (2012). 
163 Id. 
164 ConocoPhillips Company v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07 /30, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify L. Yves Fortier, Q.C., 
Arbitrator (Feb. 27, 2012), available at http:/ /icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
Index.jsp. 
165 Judge Kenneth Keith of the International Court of Justice and Professor 
Georges Abi-Saab. 
166 Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /5, 
Recommendation Pursuant to the Request by ICSID on the Respondent's Proposal 
476 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 35:2 
In terms of the threshold standard required to win a challenge, 
the ICSID Convention provides that a party may propose the 
disqualification of an arbitrator" on account of any fact indicating a 
manifest lack of the qualities" required to be nominated.167 This 
standard of review was used in ICSID Decision on the Proposal to 
Disqualify an Arbitrator in ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela. In this case, 
a few days after the proceedings were suspended, the challenger's 
arbitrator informed the parties and the Tribunal members that he 
had resigned from his firm.168 He also confirmed that an ethics 
screen was established and would be maintained until his 
departure. 169 In its pleadings, Venezuela argued, however, that 
several facts constituted "a circumstance that might cause [an 
arbitrator's] reliability for independent judgment to be questioned 
by a party."170 Venezuela asserted its objection was "not 
for the Disqualification of [Arbitrator] (Dec. 19, 2011). Note that, under ICSID 
Rules, when the sole arbitrator is challenged, or when the majority of the 
arbitrators are challenged, it is for a neutral authority to decide on the challenge. 
Decisions are normally taken by the Chairman of the Administrative Council of 
the World Bank, but are also at times referred to a neutral authority, like the 
Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). 
167 See ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 57 (noting that the necessary 
"qualities" are listed in paragraph (1) of Article 14 and adding that "[a] party to 
arbitration proceedings may, in addition, propose the disqualification of an 
arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal 
under Section 2 of Chapter IV."). See also ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 49, 
at r. 9 (detailing the procedure to be taken: "(1) A party proposing the 
disqualification of an arbitrator pursuant to Article 57 of the Convention shall 
promptly, and in any event before the proceeding is declared closed, file its 
proposal with the Secretary-General, stating its reasons therefor. (2) The 
Secretary-General shall forthwith: (a) transmit the proposal to the members of the 
Tribunal and, if it relates to a sole arbitrator or to a majority of the members of the 
Tribunal, to the Chairman of the Administrative Council; and (b) notify the other 
party of the proposal. (3) The arbitrator to whom the proposal relates may, 
without delay, furnish explanations to the Tribunal or the Chairman, as the case 
may be. (4) Unless the proposal relates to a majority of the members of the 
Tribunal, the other members shall promptly consider and vote on the proposal in 
the absence of the arbitrator concerned. If those members are equally divided, 
they shall, through the Secretary -General, promptly notify the Chairman. of the 
proposal, of any explanation furnished by the arbitrator concerned and of their 
failure to reach a decision. (5) Whenever the Chairman has to decide on a 
proposal to disqualify an arbitrator, he shall use his best efforts to take that 
decision within 30 days after he has received the proposal. (6) The proceeding 
shall be suspended until a decision has been taken on the proposal."). 
168 ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /30, ~ 11. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. ~~ 23-25 (change in original). 
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predicated on any actual lack of independence or impartiality, but 
on apprehension of the appearance of impropriety."m In contrast, 
ConocoPhillips argued a disqualification must be based on facts 
that demonstrate "a manifest lack of the required qualities" in an 
arbitrator.172 
The Tribunal found the applicable legal standard was provided 
in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention, and stated that a party may 
propose the disqualification of any tribunal member for "manifest 
lack of the qualities" required to sit as an arbitrator, namely a 
"high moral character" and the capacity to "exercise independent 
judgment."173 The Tribunal also remarked that the term "manifest" 
in Article 57 means "'obvious' or 'evident' and highly probable, 
not just possible."174 Applying the "manifest" standard, the 
Tribunal dismissed the challenge.175 
Regardless of the specific merits of any case, having the 
remaining arbitrators decide a challenge to a fellow arbitrator is 
improper and puts the remaining arbitrators in a difficult and 
uneasy position. Arbitrators are still selected from a small group 
of qualified individuals and most know each other and have long-
standing professional relationships. Asking arbitrators to judge 
171 Id. '1[31, at 10 (stating Venezuela's argument that the case does not revolve 
around the possibility of lack of independence but on the apprehensions of 
appearance of impropriety). 
172 Id. 'If 35, at 16 (stating that the Tribunal noted that Respondent had 
refereed to General Standard 7(c) of the IBA Guidelines, stating that "[a]n 
arbitrator is under a duty to make reasonable enquiries to investigate any 
potential conflict of interest, as well as any facts or circumstances that may cause 
his or her impartiality of independence to be questioned. Failure to disclose a 
potential conflict is not excused by lack of knowledge if the arbitrator makes no 
reasonable attempt to investigate."). 
173 Id. 'If 51, at 16 (mentioning that the Convention provides in art. 14(1) that 
the members of the panel have to be of high moral character). 
174 Id. 'If 56. The Tribunal noted that article 57 states that the term "manifest" 
means "obvious" and this standard "imposes a relatively heavy burden on the 
party proposing disqualification." Id. 
175 Id. '1['1[64-65 (noting that the Tribunal had no reason to doubt Mr. Fortier's 
statements that he "had not been involved in any way in the negotiation, that he 
had not taken part in or been privy to the plans for the international arbitration 
group in the combined firm, that he had no knowledge of any file, if any exists, on 
which lawyers from the two firms had been working together and he 
'categorically' stated that he had no involvement in any such file, nor had he been 
made privy to any information about any such file."). This denial implies that his 
high moral character and capacity to exercise independent judgment were thus 
not called into question. 
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challenges of a person with whom they likely have and will 
continue to have professional relations is improper. 
Further, the threshold adopted by tribunals does not properly 
address concerns that may arise relating to party-appointed 
arbitrators who are perceived as being excessively inclined to 
decide in favor of the party that appointed them. This is 
particularly true for repeat appointments. A revision of the ICSID 
challenge procedure would significantly alleviate the inherent 
biases concern. The example set in the UNCITRAL Rules is a step 
in the right direction. 
The 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that any 
arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to 
"justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or 
independence."176 The UNCITRAL threshold is different and 
would allow more meaningful review of the facts that lead to the 
challenge. Further, challenges under UNCITRAL Rules are to be 
decided by the appointing authority, and not by the remaining 
members of the Tribunal.177 
For example, the Decision on the Challenge of an Arbitrator in 
Vito G. Gallo v. Canada was taken under UNCITRAL Rules,178 In 
this case, the claimant filed a challenge after learning that the 
professional situation of the arbitrator appointed by Respondent 
had changed since the commencement of the arbitration. At the 
time of his appointment, the challenged arbitrator was in the 
process of joining a large Canadian law firm as an independent 
176 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 12, 10(1). 
177 Id. at art. 13(4) (stating that "[i)f, within 15 days from the date of the notice 
of challenge, all parties do not agree to the challenge or the challenged arbitrator 
does not withdraw, the party making the challenge may elect to pursue it. In that 
case, within 30 days from the date of the notice of challenge, it shall seek a 
decision on the challenge by the appointing authority"). The prior UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 1976 adopted the same general method. Article 12 provides: 
the decision on the challenge will be made: (a) [w]hen the initial 
appointment was made by an appointing authority, by that authority; (b) 
[w]hen the initial appointment was not made by an appointing 
authority, but an appointing authority has been previously designated, 
by that authority; (c) [i]n all other cases, by the appointing authority to 
be designated in accordance with the procedure for designating an 
appointing authority as provided for in article 6. 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, at art. 12(1). 
178 Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Decision on the 
Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher Thomas, QC (Oct. 14, 2009). 
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consultant to focus on serving as an arbitrator.179 In this new role, 
he subsequently agreed to advise Mexico on legal matters, which 
could include international investment arbitration.1so The case was 
filed with the ICSID Deputy Secretary-General, who acted as the 
appointing authority in the case.181 The Deputy Secretary General 
heard comments from all parties and eventually determined that 
the arbitrator would have to choose between continuing to provide 
legal advice to Mexico or serving as an arbitrator in the case.182 
The Deputy Secretary-General examined the situation and 
clarified that the applicable standard under UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules was an objective one.183 In his view, the potential for conflict 
in this case lay in the fact that Mexico under NAFTA could 
participate in the proceedings (as non-disputing parties) on 
questions of interpretation of NAFTA.184 He therefore clarified that 
"from the point of view of a 'reasonable and informed third party' 
... there would be justifiable doubts about [the arbitrator's] 
impartiality and independence ... if he were not to discontinue his 
advisory services to Mexico for the remainder of this 
arbitration."1ss The arbitrator resigned from the arbitration seven 
days later_186 
The comparisons above demonstrate that UNCITRAL Rules 
provide a better challenge procedure because a neutral authority 
179 Id. ~~ 6-7. 
180 Id. ~ 8. 
181 Id. ~~ 2-3. 
182 Id. ~ 36. 
183 I d. 
184 Id. ~ 36. 
185 I d. 
186 In another interesting case, ICS Inspection & Control Services Ltd. v. The 
Republic of Argentina, Decision on Challenge to Mr. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, the 
challenge of an arbitrator was upheld by the appointing authority chosen by the 
Secretary-General of PCA under the UNCITRAL Rules. See generally ICS 
Inspection & Control Services Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, 
Decision on Challenge to Mr. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Arbitrator (Dec. 17, 2009). 
In the case, Argentina challenged Mr. Alexandrov, the arbitrator appointed by 
claimant, claiming that he and his law firm's concurrent representation in a 
separate, long-running case against Argentina gave rise to justifiable doubts as to 
the arbitrator's independence and impartiality. Id. In making his decision 
upholding the challenge, the appointing authority referred to the IBA Guidelines 
and found that the facts underlying Mr. Alexandrov's disclosure were reflected in 
scenarios set forth in the Guidelines. Id. The appointing authority concluded that 
the conflict was sufficiently serious to give rise to objectively justifiable doubts as 
to Mr. Alexandrov's impartiality and independence. Id. 
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resolves challenges and the threshold is different, reqmrmg a 
"justifiable doubt" standard. To ensure legitimacy of its decisions 
and a wider support of international investment arbitration, ICSID 
should also move towards asking a neutral tribunal to decide on 
challenges, based on a different threshold. This change can only be 
made through an amendment of the ICSID Convention. Though it 
would be very difficult to negotiate, it is necessary if we wish to 
maintain the success of the international investment arbitration 
system and support of all parties involved_IB7 
It is also important to note that most tribunals refer to the 
International Bar Association's Guidelines on Conflict of Interests 
in International Arbitration to assess challenges, and specifically 
the existence of a conflict.1BB These Guidelines are particularly 
important because they are detailed and offer a viable framework 
to decide on the existence of a conflict. Moreover, because they 
refer to the point of view of a "reasonable and informed third 
party," they also offer a clear angle to be used by tribunals.JB9 
Their continued and more frequent use by tribunals operating 
under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules is desirable. Indeed, it 
would be useful if parties specifically agree to use the IBA 
Guidelines at the outset of the arbitral proceedings. 
The importance of adopting common rules to strengthen the 
arbitrator selection system cannot be overestimated. It will give 
the parties clear guidance and predictability when selecting 
international arbitrators. It will also allow arbitrators to adopt 
uniform and clear behavior, and send a strong signal to the general 
public that their concerns are fully taken into consideration. 
4.2. Ensuring Diversity (and Legitimacy) By Enlarging the Pool of 
Arbitrators 
An important criticism recognized empirically is the lack of 
diversity - both geographic and gender - of those who are selected 
as arbitrators. Thus, a second important measure that can be taken 
187 On this issue, see Chiara Giorgetti, Challenges of International Investment 
Arbitrators - How it Works, and Does it Work?, 7 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 303 
(2013). 
188 COUNCIL OF THE INT'L BAR Ass'N, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFUCf OF INTEREST 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2004), available at http:/ jwww.ibanet.org/ 
Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx. 
189 I d. at 8. 
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to strengthen the international arbitration system is to enlarge the 
pool of arbitrators. More arbitrators from outside Europe and 
North America, and more women are needed. 
In fact, though the numbers of international arbitration cases 
has increased in recent years, the group of arbitrators selected by 
parties to decide their cases is still small. This means that often the 
same persons are appointed. Moreover, instances exist where the 
same person may act as counsel in a case and as arbitrator in 
another case. These situations lead to criticism of the arbitration 
system. Additionally, the lack of diversity seen together with the 
increased use of arbitration will inevitably result in more real or 
perceived conflicts by selected arbitrators and thus in more 
challenges by the parties_190 Indeed, non-party stakeholders also 
identify lack of diversity as a cause of concern.t91 
As arbitration is based on the freedom of the party, it may 
sound counterintuitive, or even contradictory, to guide a party's 
choice as a way to strengthen investment arbitration. However, as 
the number of cases increases, a larger pool of arbitrators will also 
result in expedited proceedings and fewer challenges of arbitrators 
during the proceedings. 
It is widely accepted both at domestic and international levels 
that "a diverse judiciary is an indispensable requirement of any 
democracy."t92 Indeed, the need for geographical representation is 
even more important in the international dispute resolution 
setting.t93 Chief Justice McLachlin of Canada argued specifically 
that a better gender balance between female and male judges 
190 See Jeremy K. Sharpe, Introductory Note to the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted 
Under Annex Vll of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Republic 
of Mauritius v. United Kingdom & Northern Ireland, Reasoned Decision on Challenge, 51 
I.L.M. 350, 351 (2012) (highlighting "the complications that can arise when the 
arbitrator plays multiple roles, including as counsel, adviser, or international 
judge"). 
191 EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 106 (describing the community of 
arbitrators as "'small, secret, clubby,' 'an inner circle,' 'a closed homogenous 
group comprised of grand old men' ... 'or even an arbitration mafia"') (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
192 Centre for Int'I Cts. & Tribunals, Selecting International Judges: Principle, 
Process and Politics 37 (University College London, Discussion Paper, 2008), 
available at http:/ /www.ucl.ac.uk/lawsjcictjdocs/Selecting_Int_Judges.pdf 
(quoting Lady Hale, The Appointment and Removal of Judges: Independence and 
Diversity, International Association of Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference 
(May 3-7, 2006)). 
193 Id. 
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would better reflect the composition of our society, and thus more 
women judges would increase the legitimacy of the courts, reflect 
the commitment to equality of our society, best use available 
human capital, bring a new perspective, and route out rooted 
stereotypes.194 
The same can be said in support of other types of diversity. 
Indeed, diversity is beneficial for several reasons. First, diversity 
brings more points of views in deliberation so that a more 
comprehensive understanding of the parties' position is granted. 
Thus, diversity brings better judgments. Second, diversity 
enhances legitimacy because a more diverse tribunal better mirrors 
the composition of society. Hence, diversity also results in 
stronger judgments. Importantly, as international investment cases 
increasingly touch on public policy matters, it becomes particularly 
important to include multiple and diverse point of views within 
the persons that decide disputes. 
To ensure that diversity is enhanced within the party-guided 
system that characterizes international investment arbitration, 
efforts should concentrate on voluntary measures. First, several 
actions to enlarge the pool of arbitrators can be taken directly by 
the neutral appointing authorities when making selection. Second, 
the parties can also play a role in reaching that goal. 
4.2.1. Actions By Appointing Authorities and Secretariats 
The neutral authorities that participate in the selection of 
arbitrators can directly adopt several targeted measures to directly 
enhance diversity, and, at different stages in the proceedings, do 
not require any specific mandate by Member States. First and 
foremost, appointing authorities should promote diversity when 
they select presiding and co-arbitrators or members of ad hoc 
annulment committees. Specifically, for example, the 
Administrative Council Chairman, the ICSID Secretary General 
and the PCA Secretary General should, whenever possible, include 
194 See Mary-Ann Hedlund & Susan Glazebrook, Foreward, in THE IAWJ: 
TWENTY YEARS OF JUDGING FOR EQUAUTY 2, 3 (Mary-Ann Hedlund, Susan 
Glazebrook, Arline Pacht & Jill Wainwright eds., 2010), available at 
www.iawj.org/JUBILEE_BOOK_IAWJ_WEBSITE_FINAL_1_.pdf (stating that in a 
world where one of the primary functions of the judiciary is to promote equality, 
it would be anomalous to exclude women from being a part of it). See also Van 
Harten, supra note 100. 
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new and diverse candidates on the lists of three candidates given 
to the parties for selection. 
Second, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council can 
more specifically further diversity when exercising his or her right 
in selecting the ten members of the Panel of Arbitrators. In his last 
selection in 2012, the Chairman designated only three women out 
of tenJ95 This is not sufficient. Though other diversity 
requirements were considered, more must be done at the 
institution level. 
Third, ICSID' s Secretary General should urge ICSID 
Contracting States to nominate arbitrators to the ICSID Panel of 
Arbitrators with the objective of advancing diversity. Each 
Contracting State has a Convention right to nominate four people, 
who do not necessarily have to be nationals of the nominating 
State, to the Panel of ArbitratorsJ96 Members of the Arbitrator 
Panels are important: if the parties fail to agree on who to 
nominate as the presiding arbitrators, the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council must select the members of the panel to 
make the nomination. Panel members are also used to nominate 
members of ad hoc annulment committees and arbitrators that the 
parties have failed to nominate. Thus, a list that contains more 
names of potential arbitrators will offer the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council more choice. At the moment, less than half 
of the parties to the ICSID Convention avail themselves of that 
right and nominate members in the List of Arbitrators.197 If more 
195 News Release, ICSID, New Designations to the ICSID Panels (Aug 29, 
2012), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases 
.jsp. 
196 Under the ICSID Convention. 
[t]he Centre maintains a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators 
pursuant to Articles 12-16 of the ICSID Convention. Each ICSID 
Contracting State may designate up to four persons to each Panel. The 
designees may, but need not, be nationals of the designating country. In 
addition, up to ten persons may be designated by the Chairman of the 
ICSID Administrative Council. Each designee normally serves for a 
renewable term of six years. 
News Release, ICSID, New Designations to the ICSID Panels (Feb. 8, 2012), 
available at https:/ficsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases 
RH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Anno 
uncements&pageName=Announcement104. 
197 At present, 108 out of the 158 member states have made some forms of 
arbitrators' selection. See ICSID, Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of 
Arbitrators, ICSID/10, at 4-6 (Sept. 2013) (providing a list of the 108 states which 
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parties to the Convention nominated diverse arbitrators, this 
would increase diversity substantially. While there have been 
some efforts to urge Member States to designate their members in 
the Panel of Arbitrators, the efforts are still inadequate and more 
can be done. For example, there could be a yearly reminder sent to 
parties urging them to make selections. Additionally, when new 
members join -like Kosovo and South Sudan have recently done-
they should immediately be advised to make their selections. 
Fourth, the ICSID and the PCA Secretariats could develop a 
best-practices policy for parties and third-party appointing 
authorities to include diversity as an item to be considered when 
making arbitration selections. These guidelines would not be 
mandatory, but would enumerate and describe the issues to be 
considered when making appointments. They could highlight the 
existence and importance of diversity as a consideration when 
making appointments. To be effective, these guidelines should 
explain the benefits of diversification and include statistics related 
to past appointments. 
None of these measures require Member States' authorizations 
and can be immediately implemented by the appointing 
authorities. If explained carefully, they will not be seen as an 
imposition to the parties, but, rather, a form of assistance to 
decision making. 
4.2.2. Actions By Parties 
Although most of the new nominations will likely result from 
appointments by the neutral appointing authority, parties can also 
be urged to include diversity in their choice. Many governments, 
which by definition are one of the parties to the dispute, have 
policies mandating diversity. These policies should be used for the 
selection of arbitrators and the nomination of members of the panel 
of arbitrators. Further, best practices given to parties can provide 
background and reinforce the importance of diversity and new 
appointments. 
Moreover, as a general policy, data on the lack of diversity 
should be publicized. While anecdotal evidence is often discussed, 
it is now possible to back that evidence with hard data. The data 
have designated panel members), available at https:/ /icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&req 
From= ICSIDPanels&language= English. 
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should be publicized to counsel, practitioners and stakeholders. In 
conjunction with the lack of diversity, the benefits of diversity 
should also be made known.198 Additionally, and more concretely, 
the data should be included in ICSID's and PCA's annual reports. 
This dissemination of information would foster dialogue among 
stakeholders, organizing conferences, and public statements. 
Once the appointing authority tests new and diverse arbitrator 
appointments, the confidence and reliance of new arbitrators will 
trickle down to party appointments. This will eventually result in 
a larger pool of arbitrators. Appointments of new candidates 
should be publicized by the parties involved and can be used to 
strengthen support of domestic constituencies and other 
stakeholders. For example, the United States is the only country to 
have appointed three women as arbitrators in its disputes. 
Publicizing this fact would strengthen the US's position amongst 
critics of international arbitration. 
Although these measures will take time to bring concrete 
results, these soft measures would ensure that a larger pool of 
arbitrators is available. Importantly, because they have been 
vetted by practice, these arbitrators will find support within the 
international arbitration practitioner circle. 
5. CONCLUSION 
International investment arbitration process is still a relatively 
new species among the international dispute resolution genres. 
As Professor Brigitte Stern suggests "Darwinism applies to 
arbitration."199 The difficulties international investment arbitration 
198 This includes the inclusion of more points of view in the discussion of a 
case, resulting in a better and more thorough decision and time saved, because 
there would be more available arbitrators. 
199 An Interview with the Honorable Charles N. Brower and Professor Brigitte Stern, 
ARBITRATION TRENDS (Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP), Winter 2013, at 
13 (quoting Professor Brigitte Stern as stating: "Darwinism applies to arbitration: 
I see evolutions, criticisms and further evolutions. Four years ago, I was in a 
colloquium at Columbia University where the central topic was the legitimacy 
crisis of the system of international arbitration. I said at that time that, a [sic] far 
as I was concerned, this looked like a crise de croissance, a teenager's crisis, the BIT 
revolution having only started some 18 years ago. The teenager is now in his 
twenties and should become more reasonable .... It is true that some countries 
have manifested their discontent with recent awards or annulment decisions and 
that some countries- Bolivia in May 2007, Ecuador in July 2009 and Venezuela in 
January 2012 - have denounced the ICSID Convention ... [t]his is certainly a sign 
of dissatisfaction but should not be overestimated."). 
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suffers are the normal products of its evolution. Criticisms will 
allow the growth and betterment of the system. As academics and 
practitioners, we should ensure the evolution of the species, not its 
extinction. 
